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Abstract 
 
Sentimentalism as an ethical view makes a particular claim about moral judgment: to 
judge that something is right/wrong is to have a sentiment/emotion of 
approbation/disapprobation, or some kind of positive/negative feeling, toward that thing. 
However, several sentimentalists have argued that moral judgments involve not only 
having a specific kind of feelings or emotional responses, but judging that one would be 
justified in having that feeling or emotional response. In the literature, some authors have 
taken up the former position because the empirical data on moral judgment seems to 
suggest that justification is not a necessary prerequisite for making a moral judgment. 
Even if this is true, however, I argue that justifying moral judgments is still an important 
philosophic endeavour, and that developing an empirically constrained account of how a 
person might go about justifying his feelings/emotional responses as reasons for 
rendering (normative) moral judgments by using a coherentist method of justification is 
both plausible and desirable.  
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Introduction 
 
“Ethical Naturalism has yet to find a plausible synthesis of the empirical and the 
normative: the more it has given itself over to descriptive accounts of the origin of norms, 
the less has it retained recognizably normative force; the more it has undertaken to 
provide a recognizable basis for moral criticism of reconstruction, the less has it retained 
a firm connection with descriptive social or psychological theory.”  
 
Peter Railton, "Moral Realism." 
 
As an ethical theory, sentimentalism bases morality in feelings, emotions, desires, 
passions, or sentiments. It has come under different guises in recent years, such as 
emotivism and expressivism. Despite the varying use of terminology, the defining trait is 
an emphasis on describing moral behaviour, judgment and knowledge in terms of what 
we feel as opposed to what we reason. Sentimentalists tell us that ‘feelings’ of one kind 
or another guide our moral lives; these feelings tell us what is wrong, what is right, and 
help us decide – or simply decide for us – what we morally ought to believe and do. 
Sentimentalism makes a particular claim about moral judgment: to judge that 
something is right/wrong is to have a sentiment/emotion of approbation/disapprobation, 
or some kind of positive/negative feeling, toward that thing. This position on moral 
judgment marks out sentimentalism in its simplest from. However, many sentimentalists 
argue that such a simple sentimentalism fails to capture something distinctive and 
important about moral judgment. They claim that to judge that something is wrong is not 
just to have a negative feeling toward something, but rather to judge that it would be 
justifiable or appropriate to have some negative feeling toward that thing. I will refer to 
the former position as simple sentimentalism, and the latter as neo-sentimentalism. 
Proponents of simple sentimentalism include Shaun Nichols and Jesse Prinz; proponents 
of neo-sentimentalism include Alan Gibbard, Justin D'Arms, Daniel Jacobson, and, in 
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some of his moods, Simon Blackburn.1
Aside from their differences regarding moral judgment, simple sentimentalists and 
neo-sentimentalists differ in another important respect. In recent years, Shaun Nichols, 
and to a lesser extent Jesse Prinz, have capitalized on an emerging empirical literature 
that carves out a very important role for the emotions in moral behaviour and thought. 
Because of their emphasis on psychology and neuroscience, these authors emphasize 
developing a descriptive, rather than a normative, moral theory. Indeed, this fact is at the 
root of the disagreement between simple and neo-sentimentalists about moral judgment: 
neo-sentimentalism does not fare very well as a descriptive theory of moral judgment, 
whereas simple sentimentalism does not capture the normative aspects of moral judgment 
very well.  
One hopes that it is at least possible that these differences can be reconciled. Indeed, 
the aim of this paper will be to show that a sentimentalist theory of moral judgment can 
be descriptively and empirically accurate while still maintaining a normative dimension, 
which in my opinion is necessary for it to be an acceptable philosophical moral theory. 
Because the difference between the opposing positions regarding moral judgment boils 
down to whether or not they believe that a person's emotional responses, or tendencies to 
have certain emotional responses, need to be justified in some important sense if that 
person is going to base (normative) moral judgments on those responses, the goal of this 
paper will be to outline how a person might go about justifying his emotional responses 
as reasons for rendering (normative) moral judgments. 
                                                                          
1 For a more detailed description of the defining characteristics of neo-sentimentalism, see Justin D'Arms and Daniel 
Jacobson's "Sentiment and Value." For more on simple sentimentalism, see Shaun Nichols, "Sentimental Rules," and 
Jesse Prinz, “The Emotional Basis of Moral Judgments.” 
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Before giving a brief outline of how this paper will proceed, a terminological issue 
needs addressing. In the following, instead of talking about people's emotional responses 
to things, I will talk about their 'affective' responses. The main reason for this is that I 
want to keep clear of the conceptual baggage that goes along with the word 'emotion.' 
For, as we will see, a person could have an affective response to something without it 
being true that she is in the grips of a particularly emotional experience, as most people 
understand 'emotional.' Moreover, people tend to think that if something is emotional 
then it cannot be cognitive, in the same sense as desires and beliefs are often taken to be 
distinct. However, this belief, as I will argue, oversimplifies what is at issue (see below, 
ch. 2, section 3). In addition, in the relevant psychological and neuroscientific literature 
one finds people using terms like 'affective response,' 'affect representation,' and 
'affective tone' more often than one finds people using terms like 'emotional response,' 
'emotional representation,' and 'emotional tone.' Based on these considerations, it seemed 
appropriate and natural to talk more so in terms of affect rather than in terms of emotion. 
With that out of the way, once more, the goal of this paper will be to outline how a 
person could go about justifying his affective responses as reasons for rendering 
(normative) moral judgment. 
 In chapter one, I will first examine simple sentimentalist theories of moral 
justification in some detail. This discussion will help carve out an important place for 
neo-sentimentalist construals of moral judgment in a more comprehensive sentimentalist 
moral theory. Second, through an examination of Shaun Nichols' argument against moral 
objectivity, I will show how affective responses are in a sense prima facie normative, just 
in virtue of their motivational force and phenomenological presence. This will lead into 
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the next section, which outlines three ways in which we could attempt to justify our 
affective responses: through self-justification, external justification, and internal 
justification, and argues that internal justification is the most promising method. 
Chapter two tackles two salient objections to an emotion-heavy sentimentalist 
account of moral judgment put forward by Stephen Darwall, Alan Gibbard, and Peter 
Railton in their “Toward Fin de Siecle Ethics.” The first of these objections points to the 
fact that a person can make a moral judgment about something while having lost all 
disposition to feelings toward that thing, which leads one to think that feelings are not 
necessarily implicated in moral judgment. After replying to this objection, I go on to 
argue that people can indeed reason about their emotions, and make judgments on the 
basis of them, without being in what is commonly thought of as an emotional state. The 
second objection is more pointed. It questions whether 'feelings' or dispositions to have 
them are necessary for explaining moral judgments at all, if those feelings are in fact 
caused by a special kind of cognitive judgment in the first place, as many emotions 
theorists would have it. After replying to this objection, I argue that, explanations aside, a 
normative account of moral judgment needs to take into account the feelings we associate 
with affective response. 
In chapter three, I propose that a suitably precise notion of coherence provides the 
best method whereby a person can justify his affective responses as reasons for rendering 
moral judgments. In the first section, I will analyze Linda Radzik's recent development of 
a coherentist account of normative authority, in order to formulate the conditions that a 
coherentist theory of the justification of affective responses should meet. The most 
important of these conditions will require that the theory be first-person accessible and 
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regress-avoiding. In the second section, I propose a formula for the justification of 
affective responses, which will rely on the prima facie normativity inherent in affective 
response. In fact, it is the normative quality of affective responses that will allow the 
theory to meet the first-person accessibility and regress-avoiding conditions.   
 5
 Simple Sentimentalism, Moral Judgment, and Normativity 
Despite their empirical sensibilities, simple sentimentalist theories often seem 
inadequate when applied to normative issues. Shaun Nichols has this to say about the 
normative status of our affective responses: "There is no principled basis for maintaining 
that these certain emotions (on which our moral judgments depend) are the right 
emotions." (Nichols 185). If we ask ourselves whether we really should believe or act on 
the basis of any affective response, I take Nichols to suggest, there are not any principled 
reasons on offer. As will become apparent, Nichols does not think that we need to justify 
our affective responses in order to take the moral judgments we base on them seriously. 
Rather, he thinks that we should accept our affective responses at face value.  
For the sentimentalist concerned with the possibility of justifying affective responses, 
this position presents a pointed objection, and it deserves careful consideration. We need 
to examine why empirically informed sentimentalists take on this type of position, to see 
what its merits are, and to take what we can from it. To do so, I will describe how 
Nichols’ theory of moral judgment is an attempt to develop a descriptive account of 
moral judgment, and that he succeeds in this task. Next, I will present Nichols’ argument 
against moral objectivity, and in doing so I will criticize his notion of ‘the persistence of 
moral judgment’.  Following that, I will further analyze Nichols’ views on the 
justification of affective responses, and I will use Simon Blackburn’s exposition of a 
similar position to show both the pitfalls and the positives of the simple sentimentalist 
approach to justification of affective responses, and how these pitfalls can be avoided.   
Nichols on Moral Judgment 
Nichols’ sentimentalist theory of moral judgment diverges from the neo-
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sentimentalist view. Within it, for a judgment to be moral, two things must be implicated 
by that judgment: a normative theory, and an affective mechanism that is sensitive to 
suffering and distress of others (18). The normative theory he invokes “prohibits actions 
of a certain type, and actions of that type generate strong affective response” (18). If we 
think of the normative theory Nichols mentions as a body of rules governing behaviour, 
then moral judgments are simply invocations of rules that prohibit (or in some other way 
relate to) actions that cause people to suffer. Because of the connection between suffering 
in others and negative affect, these rules are infused with feeling, and hence Nichols calls 
them ‘sentimental rules.’ A neo-sentimentalist theory would require that a normative 
assessment about whether the response instantiated by the ‘affective mechanism’ is 
justified, appropriate, or warranted in some important sense. Nichols does not think that 
some kind of normative assessment must have taken place in order for a proper moral 
judgment to be made.  
Why does Nichols reject the neo-sentimentalist approach to moral judgment? An 
important motivating belief is that neo-sentimentalist accounts of moral judgment are 
descriptively inaccurate (Nichols 89; Prinz 35). For, according to the standard neo-
sentimentalist view, making a moral judgment involves making an assessment about the 
appropriateness of an affective response; it requires that people have the capacity for 
normative assessment if they are to be able to make genuine moral judgments. This 
approach is misled, Nichols says, because it seems that children and autistics, who lack 
the capacity for normative assessment as neo-sentimentalists describe it, make genuine 
moral judgments. Nichols terms this the disassociation argument: if people without the 
capacity for normative assessment do indeed make moral judgments, then we cannot say 
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that moral judgments necessarily have a normative element (89-90). Because children 
and autistics fit this description, we need to define ‘core moral judgment’ so that the 
moral judgments children and autistics make are included in that definition. Going 
further, he argues that many of the everyday moral judgments made by adults might not 
rely on some prior normative assessment (93-94).  
This view makes some sense; many people are probably not as concerned about 
morality as ethicists would like them to be. It seems reasonable that a good description of 
moral judgment qua moral judgment should be broad enough to capture properly the 
judgments of children, autistics, and the more everyday moral judgments adults make. 
However, there still remains the fact that thoughtful, reflective people are concerned with 
the normative status of their moral judgments, and often take making moral judgments 
quite seriously. Notice that this fact leads to two distinct problems for simple 
sentimentalists. First, because of their emphasis on ‘core moral judgment’, they neglect to 
give a descriptive accounting of how people make normative assessments. Second, 
because of their focus on providing descriptive accounts in general, they have very little 
to say about how people should engage in normative assessment. Of course, Nichols is 
not necessarily insensitive to normative issues, and, as we will see, he makes some 
comments that help define his position in relation to certain normative problems.         
Nichols is right that a properly descriptive theory of moral judgment should be more 
inclusive than the standard neo-sentimentalist construal. However there is an important 
difference between the moral judgments reflective people make and those made by 
children and people with autism. Non-autistic adults do have the capacity for normative 
assessment; many exercise it and consider the results of doing so important. Children’s 
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moral judgments express what they feel and what have been taught. While thoughtful, 
reflective adults’ moral judgments also often merely express what they feel and have 
been taught, the moral judgments made by thoughtful, reflective adults are different 
insofar as they are far more responsive to reasons, e.g., inconsistency with other 
judgments, or the distorting affects of situational influences.2 While we need an account 
of moral judgment that is descriptively accurate and that allows people without the 
capacity for normative assessment to make genuine moral judgments, we can at least call 
moral judgments that do involve assessments of the appropriateness of feelings 
‘normative moral judgments’. Normative moral judgments, while perhaps a subspecies of 
moral judgment simpliciter, certainly have a life of their own, and deserve investigation 
both in the descriptive and the normative sense. Clearly, figuring out how justifying our 
affective responses gives rise to their being reasons, and how this process of justification 
should be responsive to certain kinds of reasons, is an important endeavour in its own 
right for the philosophical sentimentalist. 
Objectivity and ‘the Persistence of Moral Judgment’ 
One of the more ingenious elements in Nichols recent book “Sentimental Rules” is 
his analysis of moral objectivity. In that analysis, he uses the distinction between moral 
and conventional norms, which he takes from the psychological literature. The difference 
between moral and conventional norms (or rules, if you like) is best understood by the 
relation each bears to authority contingence. Using studies on this distinction that involve 
children, he writes: “For instance, if at another school the teacher has no rule against 
chewing gum, children will judge that it is not wrong to chew gum at that school; but 
                                                                          
2 Adults also grapple with more complex and weightier moral cases than children. Compare ‘pulling hair is wrong’ 
with ‘genocide is wrong.’ 
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even if the teacher at another school has no rule against hitting, children claim that it is 
still wrong to hit” (6). Moral violations, like hitting, are not contingent on authority, 
whereas conventional violations, like chewing gum, are contingent on authority. One can 
also understand this distinction by considering its relation to harm norms. Norms against 
harming others fall on the moral side of the distinction, whereas norms that do not tend to 
fall on the conventional side. Moral norms always implicate some kind of victim, where 
conventional norms do not (Blair et al. 15).3 Further, he argues that harm norms have this 
status because they are keyed to the emotional distress that normal people feel when 
confronted by the suffering of others (64). 
 The relationship that Nichols posits between the moral/conventional distinction and 
objectivity is easily understood. He understands the basic tenet of moral objectivism to be 
that certain actions are wrong (right) non-relativistically, i.e., certain actions are wrong 
independently of individual preferences, beliefs, etc. (Nichols 169). If we consider the 
non-authority contingence, i.e. the non-relative status that people ascribe to norms that 
fall on the moral side of the moral/conventional distinction, we can see that moral norms 
seem to lay prima facie claim to being objective. Why do people think that moral norms 
are non-relativistic while conventional norms are relativistic? What difference is there 
between the two that can account for the difference in perceived relativity? In short, 
conventional norms are generally not infused with feeling by affective response that is 
caused by the suffering of others, whereas moral norms, and especially harm norms, are. 
Therefore, Nichols argues, it seems that “affect somehow infuses harm norms with 
objective purport” (179, 186). 
                                                                          
3 ‘Disgusting’ norms are an interesting exception. For instance, most people would say that it is always and everywhere 
wrong to spit on another person. 
 10
Now, if affect is what causes us to believe, pre-reflectively, that moral norms are 
objective, moral objectivity is on shaky ground. Unless we can show that a person 
rationally ought to have a certain affective repertoire, because that affective repertoire is 
somehow externally privileged (185), then morality is not in fact objective, but is relative 
to the affective responses each person (or group of people) has. Nichols argues that this is 
true by claiming that rational beings, such as aliens, for example, who simply did not 
manifest the same affective responses as us to suffering in others, would not be 
compelled to share our moral beliefs, as moral beliefs are dependent on affect.4 Nichols 
writes, “Furthermore, if the affect-based account is right, their disagreement with us 
would not be due to any defects in reason or to the lack of ideal circumstances. Rather, 
their disagreement with us would flow from basic, arational differences in emotional 
response” (186).  We might think that harming a person who poses no threat is wrong, 
but the aliens would disagree with us simply because they feel no distress upon causing 
innocent humans to suffer. Because the aliens in question do not have the same affective 
repertoire as us, and because of the crucial role that affect plays in determining our moral 
beliefs, there is nothing in virtue of which we can claim that the aliens must share our 
moral beliefs or affective repertoire. 
Regardless of the strengths of Nichols' argument against moral objectivity generally, 
it provides us with good reason to think that sentimentalism is at least not germane to 
moral objectivity as he defines it. If moral norms are infused with feeling because of our 
natural responses to suffering in others, which causes us to believe that moral norms are 
not contingent on authority or individual preferences and desires, then unless we can 
                                                                          
4 Nichols lists psychopaths as evidence of people who, on account of their emotional deficit, simply do not share our 
moral judgments, and therefore provide a real-world example of the aliens he describes in this argument. 
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prove that people should have a certain affective repertoire, we cannot claim that moral 
objectivity is true.  
More to the point, Nichols’ attitude towards what he calls the ‘persistence of moral 
judgment’ is both telling and problematic. Based on experiments on undergraduate 
university students who reject moral objectivism, Nichols argues that people who reject 
moral objectivity still ‘pass’ the moral/conventional task. That is, they still identify norms 
against harming others as being non-authority contingent and as more serious than norms 
against, say, disrupting the professor during class, despite the fact that they are non-
objectivists (195-196). Non-objectivists do not seem worried that their moral judgments 
are not justified by an objective morality. Indeed, Nichols writes as though they need not 
be concerned with justification at all:  
It seems presumptuous to say that giving up objectivity means that I 
should not judge harmful violations to be more serious, that I should not 
judge the wrongfulness of hitting another as independent of the teacher’s 
authority, or that I should not think that the actions are wrong because 
they are harmful. As philosophical sentimentalists have long maintained, 
you do not have to believe that an action is objectively wrong to have a 
deep and abiding opposition to such actions. (196)  
Nichols is probably right to say that we do not need to believe that an action is 
objectively wrong in order to be justified in our feeling strongly about it. However, 
perhaps there should be something in virtue of which we can say that we believe that 
something really is wrong in order to justify, to ourselves, the ‘deep and abiding 
opposition’ we feel towards it. Nichols remains silent on just what this something might 
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be, largely because he seems to force himself into a false dilemma: because we cannot 
secure objectivity, there is nothing left to be said by way of justifying our affective 
responses; it is objective justification or no justification at all. However, it seems intuitive 
that we cannot just take our individual emotional responses as given, and go on to argue 
that their phenomenological presence and psychological tie to motivation gives us all the 
reason we need to act or believe on the basis of them – our affective responses should not 
be taken to be self-justifying, as Nichols seems to imply. For, it seems that we can always 
ask whether it is good, right, beneficial, or even moral that we pass judgment and act on 
the basis of a specific affective response, and we even judge that we should or should not 
have certain responses in certain circumstances. We can reflect on our affective responses 
and in doing so we can criticize them as reasons for making normative moral judgments.  
Perhaps some examples will help illustrate the point. In a study on the relationship 
between diet and perceived morality, researchers found that there is a measurable 
difference in how moral a person is perceived by others based on diet (Stien and 
Nemeroff 487). In this study, participants were given a description of a fake person that 
described some general characteristics about him or her, such as gender, height, weight, 
favoured physical activities, and eating habits. The findings indicate that participants 
generally rated people who eat fruit, salad and chicken as more moral than people who 
eat steaks, cheeseburgers, and fries.  
In a study on the relationship between disgust and moral judgments, participants were 
hypnotized to feel disgust upon reading arbitrary words, such as 'take' and 'often.' They 
were then presented with a number of vignettes, some of which included the words 'take' 
and 'often.' These vignettes described scenarios where people ate their pet dogs, stole 
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library books, etc. There were also morally neutral vignettes; for instance, one described 
a student's council member, Dan, who tries to foster good discussions between professors 
and students about academic issues. As predicted, hypnotized participants rated the 
transgressions as more morally wrong when they felt disgust upon reading either 'take' or 
'often' in the story. Interestingly, the researchers found that, even after they were aware of 
their hypnotized state, "some participants continued to follow their gut feelings and 
condemned Dan in the student council story, even though his only crime was trying to 
foster good discussions" (Wheatley and Haidt 783). 
In both these studies, participants allowed their negative affective responses to things 
like unhealthy food and random words to influence their moral judgments. Clearly, 
should they reflect on the extraneous factors that affected their respective decisions, they 
would likely realize that their moral judgments were not an accurate reflection of their 
considered moral beliefs. If they did not, surely we want to be able to claim that the 
things some of the participants think are relevant to rendering moral judgments are 
inappropriate to that task.5 A hard working student's council member such as Dan does 
not deserve to be morally condemned for such an arbitrary reason as the disgust one feels 
because of hypnosis!  
We can reflect on the emotions we feel, and can offer criticisms and justifications of 
them. There are many subjectivist answers we can give by way of justifying or criticizing 
our affective responses that do not assume or push us toward an objective morality. 
Indeed, it is short-sighted to think that we should embrace the dictates of the emotional 
experiences we have only because of their individual phenomenological presence and 
                                                                          
5 Karen Jones makes this point albeit in a slightly different context, and with different aims. See her “Meta-Ethics and 
Emotions Research: a Reply to Prinz.” 
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motivational efficaciousness, especially if doing so encourages us to ignore our better 
judgment. 
Self-Justification, External Justification, and Internal Justification 
As we have seen, one problem with Nichols’ reasoning about the ‘persistence of 
moral judgment’ lies in the way he approaches the justification of affective response. He 
seems to assume that because our affective responses cannot be given an objective 
justification, they must be self-justifying if we are to take them seriously. Recall that he 
thinks that there is no way to find out whether we have the right set of emotions or not 
(185), largely because “our emotional responses themselves have no externally privileged 
status” (184; my emphasis). Now, what does Nichols mean by ‘externally privileged’? 
Since the job of the objectivist is supposed to be to show us that we all should have a 
specific affective repertoire, it is clear that, on pain of circularity, the objectivist cannot 
appeal to the dictates of his favoured affective repertoire when arguing that others should 
share that very same repertoire: “The objectivist cannot simply help himself to a moral 
intuition that rational creatures should have these emotions, because the Humean point is 
that our moral intuitions depend on the emotions we happen to have” (188). Thus, giving 
certain of our affective responses an externally privileged status would involve appealing 
to something other than our affective responses or the judgments we derive from them, 
for example, our shared rational nature or God's commands. Because Nichols cannot see 
an answer to this problem for moral objectivity forthcoming, he simply asserts that moral 
judgment persists, and that we do not need to be objectivists to feel comfortable in 
continuing to make such judgments. Therefore, our affective responses are, I take Nichols 
to imply, self-justifying. But as we have seen, this conclusion cannot be right. Is there 
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another way we can justify our affective responses other than by saying that they are self-
justifying? 
Nichols is not the only sentimentalist to take on the self-justification position. Perhaps 
a look at the work of Simon Blackburn, who appears to share much with Nichols’ 
position on this matter, will help us make clear just what is involved in the self-
justification position. In his article “How to be an Ethical Anti-Realist,” Blackburn 
writes:  
Does the lover escape his passion by thinking, “Oh it’s only my passion, 
forget it”? When the world affords occasion for grief, does it brighten 
when we realize that it is we who grieve? (The worst think to think is 
that if we are “rational,” it should, as if rationality had anything to tell us 
about it.) [. . .] The news comes in and the emotion comes out; nothing 
in human life could be or feel more categorical. (175) 
Blackburn’s point is simple. The categorical quality of affective responses gives us all we 
need to believe or act on their respective behalves. Talk of rational emotions is 
superfluous. In the heat of the moment, thoughts about whether one's grief, love, or joy is 
rational are each just 'one thought too many;' trying to decide whether or not a felt 
emotion is rational takes away from the proper functioning of that affective response and 
is detrimental to it.6 Thus, we should accept the categorical nature of our affective 
responses, and take them to be self-justifying. Or so I take him to imply.  
Indeed, there is an important sense in which the seeds of normativity are present in 
affective responses simpliciter, and Blackburn captures this sense well. If something is 
                                                                          
6 Bernard Williams coins the phrase ‘one thought too many’ in his paper “Persons, Character, and Morality.” 
 16
normative, for instance, a moral norm, it has a strong ‘oughtness’ to it; it compels us to 
do what it says. Affective responses seem to share this quality; they often compel us to do 
or believe. There is a certain sense in which affective responses are categorical, as 
Blackburn suggests. The sheer phenomenological force and, more importantly, the 
motivational efficacy of affective responses go far in making us feel normatively 
compelled to do or believe as they suggest.7 While we still cannot say that affective 
responses are not enough on their own to provide justification, it seems right to say that 
by their very nature they do much of the normative work by themselves.  
Notice, though, that Blackburn’s examples of affective response, love and grief, are 
perfect for proving his point about the categorical nature of the emotions. Love and grief 
smack us in the face with demands; it is difficult to escape for their respective grips, and 
following the dictates of those responses is something that we would not usually question 
a person for doing. However, there are other affective responses that, while they share 
much the same categorical quality as love and grief, should probably not move us to 
believe or act so easily. Consider envy, anger, and hate; the presence of these responses 
may seem very categorical, but does that mean that they are self-justifying? If Ted feels 
hate towards someone and acknowledges that he feels hate towards that person for no 
appreciable reason, is Ted still justified in hating him? If affective responses are self-
justifying, then the answer must be yes. But something seems horribly wrong with this 
reply; surely Ted is not justified in saying that someone is hateful only because at one 
point in the past he felt hate towards him, apparently for some reason that Ted cannot 
                                                                          
7 It is not unusual for philosophers to try to get at normativity through motivation. In fact, Stephen Darwall has 
proposed that placing normativity within the natural order requires understanding normativity through motivation: "For 
the philosophical naturalist, concerned to place normativity within the natural order, there is nothing plausible for 
normative force to be other than motivational force, perhaps when the agent's deliberative thinking is maximally 
improved by natural knowledge" (Internalism 168). 
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articulate. Hopefully, most people would criticize Ted for hating someone without 
reason, or even for feeling hate in the first place. But what could the basis for that 
criticism be?  
We could attempt to develop an external standard whereby we can justify and 
criticize our affective responses. However, recall that I have argued that the 
phenomenological force and motivational efficacy of affective responses go quite far by 
themselves in establishing normativity. Now, if we are trying to develop a standard 
external to our affective responses for normatively evaluating affective responses, we are 
developing a new normative standard that must be wholly different from the prima facie 
normativity that seems to be inherent in affective responses.8 If the external normative 
standard is not wholly new, then it would provide circular justification, which would 
defeat one of the purposes of developing a standard external to our affective responses in 
the first place.  
Attempting to develop an external normative standard would seem to be an 
unnecessary endeavour for the sentimentalist; if our affective responses already provide 
us with fodder that might help us establish normativity, we should at least see if we can 
develop an acceptable normative standard with the normative pieces that our individual 
affective responses have already provided before attempting to develop a whole new 
standard. In addition, developing a whole new normative standard presents new problems 
in its own right. For example, it is unclear how such a standard could retain the 
motivational efficaciousness associated with normativity without being somehow tied to 
affect or desire, in which case it would not be a new standard at all.  
                                                                          
8 Christine Korsgaard makes this point in her “The Sources of Normativity:” “Morality must be endorsed or rejected 
from a point of view which itself makes claims on us and so which is itself at least potentially normative” (54). 
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This reasoning leads to an interesting objection against the search for an objective 
morality within a sentimentalist framework. Because an objective justification of our 
affective responses must be an external justification (see Nichols argument against 
objectivity, described in the preceding section), and because external justifications might 
be unnecessary, attempting to formulate an objective sentimentalism might be 
unnecessary. Of course, it is only unnecessary if one does not think that objectivity must 
be a defining characteristic of an acceptable moral theory. But if one does not think this 
way, to attempt straight away to develop an objective sentimentalism might lead us into 
error, because doing so could cause us to ignore other options that may in the end turn out 
to be more plausible. 
Indeed, merely offering justifications for or criticisms of our affective responses does 
not necessarily push us toward objectivity. One can justify one’s affective responses to 
another person without thinking that the other person must necessarily be compelled to 
accept that justification because of some irresistible considerations external to the 
affective response itself. The justifications we give are just as much for our own benefit 
as they are for the benefit of our fellow conversants. Nichols’ error in approaching the 
problem of justification is that he seems to assume that this must be true: he assumes that 
any kind of justification of affective responses other than self-justification must be 
external and in the interests of securing moral objectivity. As a result, he neglects to 
investigate other forms of justification. 
 Perhaps, then, we should look to see if certain of our affective responses might be 
given some kind of internally privileged status, in the sense of internal to an individual’s 
set of affective responses, the moral values and judgments derived from those responses, 
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and, when they are relevant, any other motivating practical claims that apply to that 
individual. While obtaining this status for some our affective responses might not lead us 
to having the ‘right’ set of them, we might be led to having the ‘best’ set of affective 
responses, in the sense of ‘best relative to the individual (or group of sufficiently similar 
individuals) under consideration.’ To anticipate, the prime methodological candidate for 
attempting an ‘internal justification’ for our affective responses will be a suitably precise 
formulation of the notion of coherence. I will return to this topic in chapter three.  
Let’s go back to the hating example for a moment, to see whether an internal standard 
of criticism would allow us to criticize Ted for his hatred. In virtue of what could a 
person criticize Ted for hating someone, just because at one point Ted felt hatred for that 
person? Well, let’s assume that at some point in the past Ted has said that hating other 
people accomplishes nothing valuable. He knows that nothing he feels is valuable can 
come from hating another person. Now we have a clear reason for criticizing Ted: he is 
inconsistent. He has said that he believes that nothing that he feels is valuable can come 
from hating a person, but he also insists on hating one person in particular. In effect, Ted 
has conflicting affective responses toward his own hatred - he feels compelled to keep 
hating someone, yet he also feels that he should not. Unless Ted can, in good conscience, 
find a way to resolve this conflict, he should be compelled, on pain of inconsistency, to 
try at least not to hate the person in question. In short, there seems to be a method 
whereby we can justify and criticize our affective responses without pursuing an 
externalist course, while still avoiding the pitfalls of self-justification.  
To summarize, the self-justification position, while it sheds important light on the 
inherent normativity of affective responses, fails to deal with the fact that having an 
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affective response is not sufficient for justification. However, this does not entail that the 
theorist concerned with the justification of affective responses must attempt to find an 
external justification for them; we should first try justifying them internally, in the sense 
of internal to an individual’s set of considered affective responses, moral values, and 
judgments.  
Conclusion     
In the foregoing, I have tried to argue for three general points. First, even though the 
simple sentimentalist arguments in favour of a more inclusive definition of moral 
judgment are for the most part correct, they ignore an important subspecies of moral 
judgment, namely, normative moral judgment, which deserves consideration in its own 
right, both descriptively and normatively. Second, while Nichols argument against moral 
objectivity is very promising, his view about ‘the persistence of moral judgment’ is 
unsavoury insofar as it seems to imply that affective responses are self-justifying. Third, 
after fleshing out Nichols’ self-justification theory, and showing how it is similar to 
Blackburn’s views on the same topic, I argued that the while affective responses taken by 
themselves do have substantial normative authority, the self-justification account is quite 
limited insofar as it cannot account for cases where self-justification is not enough, both 
descriptively and normatively. However, rejecting the self-justification of affective 
responses does not drive us to attempt to try an external justification; rather, I argued, 
there is a third way: internal justification. 
Empirically informed, descriptive moral theories such as Nichols' are no doubt 
important to the study of ethics. They provide interesting insights and in many important 
ways constrain our theorizing. However, the normative questions cannot be ignored and 
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certainly are an important part of any ethical theory. An acceptable sentimentalist ethical 
theory should provide not only understanding about the subject matter of ethics but also 
some guidance about how to separate reason-giving affective responses from non-reason 
giving responses. It would have to state the conditions upon which an affective response 
can be justified as a reason for belief and action for an individual. In other words, an 
acceptable sentimentalist theory must at least make an attempt to be normatively 
adequate.  
 22
Sentimentalist Normative Moral Judgments: Replies to Objections 
In the first chapter, I argued that empirically informed sentimentalist moral theories 
tend to focus on the descriptive aspects of moral theory, and that this emphasis causes 
their moral theories to be problematic when applied to normative questions. I also argued 
that an internal method of justifying affective responses as normative reasons is the best 
form of justification for sentimentalists, while anticipating that the best method for 
justifying affective responses is a suitably precise notion of coherence. In this chapter, I 
will take a slightly different approach. In order to better understand how affective 
responses can function as justifying reasons for normative moral judgments, I will 
attempt to respond to two challenges posed for sentimentalism by Stephen Darwall, Alan 
Gibbard, and Peter Railton. 
In their review paper “Toward Fin de Siecle Ethics,” Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton 
point out two distinct but related problems for accounts of moral judgment that implicate 
the emotions. The first goes like this: “Emotivists hold that a moral judgment consists in 
a feeling – or better, in a disposition to have certain feelings. It seems, though, that a 
person can judge something wrong even if he has lost all disposition to feelings about it” 
(149). This argument presents a challenge: if moral judgment is supposed to consist in a 
feeling or a disposition to have certain feelings, how can people make moral judgments 
dispassionately? If a person does not feel the force of an affective response when making 
a moral judgment, or does not appear to be at all disposed to feelings about the specific 
content of their moral judgments, then it is not apparent that such judgments consist in 
the feelings associated with affective response, or even with dispositions to have certain 
feelings. 
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The second problem is slightly more involved:   
What then is this feeling of moral disapproval? Among theorists of 
emotion, cognitivists dominate. Emotional “cognitivism” is different from 
meta-ethical cognitivism: an emotional cognitivist thinks that having a 
certain emotion, such as anger, involves making some special kind of 
cognitive judgment. Now in the case of moral disapproval, the only 
plausible candidate is a cognitive judgment that the thing in question is 
morally wrong. If so, we need to understand judgments of wrongness 
before we can understand moral disapproval. We cannot explain the 
judgment that something is wrong as an attitude of moral disapproval. 
(149) 
Even if the emotions are implicated in moral judgment, the authors imply, they involve 
cognitive judgments. Hence, it isn’t the feeling that provides an explanation, but rather 
the cognitive judgment implicit in affective response, and therefore we should focus on 
the cognitive judgment rather than the ‘feel’ of affective responses.  
Both problems are important objections to an account of normative moral judgments 
that are justified by affective response, and I will respond to each in turn. Fortunately, a 
review of some more recent work in neurology and psychology should help decrease 
their potency. In addition to helping meet the aforementioned objections to the account of 
moral judgment on offer, this quick review will also help us better understand two very 
important things: first, in relation to the first objection, how people can reflect on and 
reason about their emotions, without being biased or overrun by an emotional experience, 
and second, in relation to the second objection, how affective responses can be thought of 
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as functioning as the normative component of moral judgments.     
Objection One: Dispassionate Moral Judgment 
The first objection poses a challenge to explain how we can make moral judgments 
dispassionately, or in the absence of any disposition to have affective responses, while 
still explaining those judgments in terms of affective response. My approach to this 
problem will be twofold. First, I will attempt to show that people can be mistaken about 
whether or not they are in an emotional state or are disposed to have certain affective 
responses. Put differently, I will argue that a person can mistakenly believe that they have 
lost any disposition to feeling toward some object. The primary motivation for this 
argument is that there is difference between how psychologists and neuroscientists talk 
about affective response, and how most people conceptualize emotional feeling or being 
in an emotional state. Once this has been clarified, I will turn to the problem of people 
who seem to make moral judgments but actually have lost all disposition to feelings 
toward the objects of their moral judgments. 
As it turns out, we can help explain why people can be mistaken about their own 
emotional states and dispositions by reference to a neurologically-based theory of the 
emotions, initially developed by Antonio Damasio, called the 'Somatic Marker 
Hypothesis.' Put simply, the determining idea behind this theory is that "decision making 
is a process which is influenced by marker signals that arise in bio-regulatory processes, 
including those that express themselves in emotions and feelings" (Bechara 25). 
Emotions are defined in terms of somatic state, because "(a) emotion induces changes in 
the physiological state of the body, and (b) the results of emotion are represented 
primarily in the brain, in the form of transient changes in the pattern of activity in the 
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somatosensory structures" (Bechara 6). These 'marker signals,' which are tied to 
representations of objects and events in our environment, express themselves as 
emotional states that provide us with evaluative information about how to interact with 
our environment. Therefore, the hypothesis suggests, the emotions perform a crucial role 
in decision making.  
The aspect of this theory relevant to the matter at hand is its postulation of two types 
of affective response. One type of response is called the 'body loop.' In this chain of 
events, the emotion is realized both in the body proper and in the relevant subcortical and 
cortical processing structures in the brain (Bechara 6). The second type of response is 
called the 'as if body loop.' Interestingly, this chain of events is supposed to occur after 
we have already experienced and expressed an affective response in the body loop, or, in 
other words, after we have 'learnt' an affective response. After this has occurred, affective 
responses can "bypass the body altogether, activate the insular and somatosensory 
cortices directly, and create a fainter image of an emotional body state than if the emotion 
were actually expressed in the body" (Bechara 7).  
Now, if a person is making a moral judgment based on an affective response that has 
been enacted in the 'as if' body loop, the feel of the affective experience that motivated 
that judgment would be weaker than that associated with judgments made based on 
affective responses that involve the body loop (Damasio 155-158). Importantly, it would 
still contain some representation of a bodily state, even if the body does not represent an 
actual bodily state. It might even be the case that certain of our affective responses are so 
well 'learnt' that the feelings associated with them could be quite faint, though there is 
not, to my knowledge, specific data on this point. On this theory an affective response 
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can still motivate a moral judgment, but the level of feeling associated with that response 
could be faint enough that it differs significantly from the way most people would 
conceptualize an emotional experience. Having this type of affective response might not 
cause people to think that they are in the grips of what they would typically conceive of 
as an emotional experience.  
Another relevant distinction involves the way in which affective responses are 
triggered. 'Primary inducers' are things that directly cause a response, for instance, a 
growling bear or first reading the letter that tells you whether or not you have won an 
important scholarship. 'Secondary inducers' are internally generated by recalling an 
emotional event, or concocting a hypothetical emotional situation, such as visualizing an 
angry bear (Bechara 12). Both types of inducers can bring about a response either in the 
body loop or the 'as if' body loop. For example, a secondary inducer, such as recalling the 
death of a loved one, can certainly cause a strong response enacted in the body loop. On 
the other hand, a primary inducer, such as looking at the ground while rock-climbing, 
could be so well-learnt for some people that it causes a weaker response that is only 
enacted in the as if body loop.  
Despite the fact that secondary inducers can bring about a strong affective response, it 
seems reasonable to postulate that secondary inducers that a) have been learnt by 
repeated experience and b) are not associated with, or have been disassociated from, any 
strong and personal emotional experiences would likely result in a weaker emotional 
response. Now, in many instances moral judgments are internally generated on the part of 
the person making a judgment, i.e. they arise 'in thought.' Because they are internally 
generated, these judgments would involve a secondary inducer. Also, making a moral 
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judgment often involves making some kind of general claim, such as 'murder is wrong,' 
which, in many cases, would not be associated with a strong, personal emotional 
experience.9 So, if one is in the habit of making a certain moral judgment based on a 
secondary inducer that is not associated with a strong, personal emotional experience or 
memory, when one makes that judgment, it will likely be accompanied by a weak 
affective response. Consider the way philosophers toss around judgments like 'murder is 
wrong' in seminar and colloquium discussions. In those contexts, standard examples of 
moral judgments function more as variables for moral judgments than as moral 
judgments themselves, even on the part of those who introduce such examples. The 
upshot is that it is no surprise that the level of feeling that people tend to associate with an 
emotional experience is not implicated in such judgments, although some feeling, 
however faint, still is. 
Remember, the challenge is to show that we can still explain a person's moral 
judgment in terms of affective response, even when the person in question "has lost all 
disposition to feelings about it" (Darwall, Gibbard and Railton 17f). Thus far, I have 
shown that under certain conditions people can make moral judgments that only implicate 
weak affective responses, which entails that people can make moral judgments without 
being in what they might call an emotional state while making that judgment, thus 
confusing them about their actual dispositions. In a sense, I have only partially responded 
to the challenge, because I have not shown that affective response is still implicated when 
a person makes a moral judgment about something that he has lost all disposition to 
feeling about it. 
                                                                          
9 With cases like 'murder is wrong,' the affect involved that motivates the judgment might even be associated more with 
social pressures rather than with actual aversion to doing another person harm, i.e. people usually don't have to murder 
someone only to find out that it is wrong; we learn these types of things more by social reinforcement, it would seem. 
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Now, if a person has lost all disposition to feelings towards something, they must 
have at some point been disposed to feelings towards that thing. Recall the psychological 
distinction make in the first chapter between conventional and moral rules. An important 
difference between the two kinds of rules is that moral rules always involve some kind of 
victim, and thus involve affective responses to harming others, whereas conventional 
rules do not (although, of course, conventional norms can involve different types of 
affective responses). I do not want to make the argument that all moral judgments 
necessarily involve some kind of victim, but it is at least reasonable to assume that a very 
important subset does involve victims and harm norms.  
With this background in mind, Shaun Nichols makes a good point: "It is likely that 
core moral judgment can persevere for at least some time after the emotions are 
eradicated. But it is also likely that over time, the tendency to treat harm norms as 
distinctive would wane" (99). So, if a person lost all disposition to feelings toward, say, 
striking another person, but still made judgments like 'striking another person is wrong,’ 
that judgment would be more like a statement of a conventional norm than a moral norm. 
Now, I do not want to make an argument about whether such judgments 'really' are moral 
judgments. But assuming that they are, such judgments would be importantly different 
from the moral judgments about harming others that normal people make, especially 
insofar as they would probably present themselves to their speakers as being contingent 
on authority, which implies that they would not be as motivationally effective. So, while 
someone might be able to make a moral judgment while having lost all disposition to 
feelings about the object of that moral judgment, the way that judgment would fit into a 
person's moral reasoning, and the extent to which they would take that judgment as a 
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constraint on their behaviour, would be severely compromised.10
Thinking about Affective Response 
Even if we are able to make moral judgments dispassionately, how does that reflect 
on the sentimentalist hypothesis in general? Should sentimentalists not want it to be the 
case that people cannot make 'real' normative judgments without being in the grips of 
some strong emotional experience? To the contrary: our ability to ‘distance’ ourselves 
from our affective responses, and our ability to evaluate whether affective responses 
actually provide us with normative reasons from that distance, are crucial when 
attempting to establish whether prima facie reasons for action and belief, in this case 
affective responses, are in fact normative reasons for us. The reasoning behind this claim 
is simple. If every time we tried to think about whether some affective response to some 
stimuli provides us with a reason for making a normative judgment, we were overrun by 
a strong emotional experience, our decisions would always be biased because we would 
be in the grips of a strong emotional experience. For example, if every time you tried to 
decide whether anger was appropriately directed at some person or state of affairs, you 
were overcome by anger, it would be difficult to judge whether that anger provides you 
with a good reason to pass moral judgment, because your natural inclination would be to 
say that your anger is in fact justified. 
The existence of a body loop and an 'as if' body loop helps answer this concern. When 
an affective response is instantiated by the 'as if' body loop, the feeling that accompanies 
it is much weaker than that that goes along with responses instantiated in the body loop, 
which suggests that once we have learnt an affective response, we are able to induce that 
                                                                          
10 While not an example of people who have lost all disposition to feel, psychopaths provide an example of people who 
never have had a disposition to feel (Blair et al. 2005). In line with this argument, psychopaths have significant 
problems when distinguishing between moral and conventional norms (Blair 1995). 
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response without putting ourselves in the grips of it. Put another way, this theory 
indicates that we can think about our affective responses without being overcome by 
them. 
In their paper "Cognitive Regulation of Emotion: Application to Clinical Disorders," 
Pierre Philippot et al. propose a theory of cognitive regulation of emotion that also helps 
to answer this concern by giving a more detailed description of how people might be able 
to think about their affective responses and the things that trigger them. This theory 
postulates that there are two ways of experiencing emotion: actually experiencing an 
emotion, and being aware of the fact that one is experiencing or has experienced emotion. 
Philippot et al. label the first type of experience 'noetic', and the second type 'autonoetic' 
(78). The theory also postulates that there are two ways in which emotions can be 
represented in the brain: in the form of propositions, and in the form of schemata. When 
represented as propositions, the emotions can be understood as declarative knowledge 
about the emotions (76). When represented as schemata, the emotions are best understood 
as "an abstract and implicit representation which integrates sensory, perceptual, and 
semantic information typical of a given category of emotional experiences, on the one 
hand, and their relation to the activation of specific body response systems, on the other" 
(75). 
Since we are talking about how a person can think about her affective responses and 
their causes, the type of emotional experience that we are most interested in is the 
autonoetic variety, as it involves us being aware of the fact that we are having or have 
had some emotional experience. On the topic of autonoetic experiences, the authors note 
that if each time one recalled some past emotional experience, one actually re-lived that 
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experience by activating the relevant emotional schema, "the whole cognitive system 
could be disrupted by the emotional arousal and would start to dysfunction" (79). 
Therefore, they argue, "autonoetic consciousness processes should have the capacity to 
regulate the activation of the schema to obtain only the schematic information needed, 
without risking potential disturbances for high level cognitive processes" (79). Therefore, 
on this theory, when a person reasons about his affective responses and their contents, he 
should be able, to some degree, to control the level to which the schema associated with 
that affective response is activated, and hence to be able to think about their affective 
responses, if he so chooses, relatively dispassionately.  
Importantly, Philippot et al. propose that one of the major functions of autonoetic 
awareness of affective experiences is to inhibit the activation of emotional schemata (and, 
conversely, allow its activation to continue). Thus, if a person is aware that she is having 
an affective response, if she judges that that response is not justified, she is able to control 
the extent to which she feels that response.  
The upshot of all this is that there is good reason to think that people can profitably 
think about their affective responses. Of course, the somatic marker hypothesis and 
Philippot et al.'s theory do not prove this decisively, but rather only give us good reasons 
for believing it is true. As far as sentimentalists are concerned, this is an important 
conclusion, as it states that people are not 'held hostage' by whatever affective responses 
that they happen to have. If we did not have a requisite amount of control over our 
affective selves, attempting to decide which affective responses are justified and which 
are not would not be a productive exercise, as we would not be able to implement any 
conclusions we might reach. Fortunately, this does not seem to be the case.  
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Before moving on to the next objection by Darwall et al., a potential inconsistency 
needs clarification. In chapter one, I argued that the phenomenological presence and 
motivational efficacy nomologically associated with affective responses gives them their 
prima facie normativity. This seems to conflict with what I have argued in the preceding, 
wherein I have stated that one does not have to have an emotional experience, 
traditionally conceived, as a consequence of having an affective response upon which one 
bases a moral judgment. I also argued that the 'feel' or phenomenological presence 
implicit in an affective response can be weaker than what people would normally 
associate with having an emotional experience, and therefore, in the case of moral 
judgments, people might mistakenly believe that emotions or affective response do not 
ground their moral judgments. In the first chapter, I talked about the importance of 
phenomenological presence and motivational efficacy, and in the preceding it might seem 
that I have argued for the opposite.  
First, we can meet this inconsistency by claiming that in 'no-pressure' situations (e.g., 
in seminar), that moral judgments only implicate a disposition to have a 
phenomenologically strong affective response in certain situations. So, when I say 
'murder is wrong,' that statement is still grounded in affective response, because, I am 
claiming, it relies on the fact that if I were in a situation where I was confronted by a 
murder, or was contemplating doing some such immoral act, I would have a strong, 
aversive emotional reaction. In addition, it is not as though no affective response at all is 
implicated in judgments made in 'no-pressure' situations; such judgments still would 
implicate a weak affective response.  
Second, there is a difference between merely uttering a moral judgment in a ‘no 
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pressure’ situation and questioning whether an affective response can function as a 
justifying reason for a moral judgment. For, in the latter case, what one is grappling with 
just is one’s affective responses, which of them one would feel in hypothetical situations, 
or even those which one has felt in emotionally memorable situations. Thus, when 
considering whether some judgment is properly motivated by an affective response, the 
pertinent factors indeed are phenomenological presence and motivational efficacy.   
Objection Two: Affective Response, Cognitive Judgments and Moral Judgments 
The second challenge posed by Darwall, Gibbard and Railton involves the nature of 
the emotions themselves. If having an affective response involves making a special kind 
of cognitive judgment, they argue, we cannot explain moral judgments in terms of the 
affect (or, in their words, ‘attitude’) inherent in affective response, because that feeling 
would have been caused by the special kind of cognitive judgment in question. We 
cannot explain the (normative) judgment that something is wrong by referencing an 
affective response whose impetus is a cognitive judgment that something is wrong (18). 
In the following, I will argue that with regard to at least one important class of moral 
emotions, this approach is correct. Moreover, I will argue that this way of looking at the 
relationship between moral judgments and affective responses is an oversimplification. 
In posing this objection, Darwall et al. refer to the dominant position of cognitivists 
among emotions theorists. In order to meet their objection, we need to pin down what 
being an emotions cognitivist in this context means. Perhaps they are talking about what 
Patricia Greenspan describes the evaluative, belief based approach to the emotions:  
As applied to accounts of the nature of emotions, the evaluative approach 
is often discussed under the heading of "cognitivism," which interprets 
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emotions themselves as amounting to or containing cognitions, usually 
seen as mental states representing evaluative propositions. The most 
straightforward version of the cognitivist view is "judgmentalism," which 
understands the nature of emotions in terms of judgments: assertive 
propositional attitudes, assessable by ordinary evidential standards applied 
to beliefs. (Practical Reasoning 209) 
Darwall et al. state quite clearly that understanding a judgment of wrongness is a 
prerequisite for understanding an attitude of moral disapproval: "Now in the case of 
moral disapproval, the only plausible candidate [to explain the attitude] is a cognitive 
judgment that the thing in question is morally wrong. If so, we need to understand 
judgments of wrongness before we can understand moral disapproval." 
Hence, Darwall et al. seem to be claiming that feelings of moral disapproval do not 
explain/cause moral judgments, but rather than moral judgments explain/cause feelings of 
moral disapproval. My approach to this problem will not be to argue that the chain of 
causal explanation necessarily runs the other way. Rather, what I hope to show is that this 
view of the relationship between judgments of wrongness is at best an oversimplification. 
The best way to accomplish this is to consider the case of psychopaths, who are severely 
diminished in their capacity to generate affective responses to the fearfulness and sadness 
of others (Blair et al. 1997, 2005; Blair 1999). Psychopaths are also notoriously prone to 
antisocial and immoral behaviour, and the likely cause of this behaviour is indeed their 
reduced ability to generate affective responses to the distress of others (Blair et al. 2005, 
ch. 8). If we apply the cognitivist approach to emotions favoured by Darwall et al. to this 
case, the root cause of psychopaths' reduced ability to generate emotional states should 
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manifest itself in a reduced ability to make certain evaluative judgments, specifically, 
judgments of moral wrongness. This brief case study will show us two things: first, that 
judgments of wrongness and feelings of moral disapproval are not per say the problem 
with psychopaths, but rather that judgments about the distress of others, and affective 
reactions toward the distress of others, are more so the problem. Second, and more 
importantly, it will show that the 'appraisals' that are involved in eliciting what are 
properly called emotional reactions, do not present themselves as judgments in any 
traditional sense.  
When tested against their ability to distinguish between transgressions and norms 
according to the moral/conventional divide, psychopaths fare quite poorly. They have 
trouble distinguishing between the two types of social transgressions. Furthermore, they 
are far less likely to give justifications for moral judgments that involve victim's welfare. 
For example, when asked why it is bad to hit another person, control subjects usually 
justify this judgment by reference to the victim's welfare, e.g. they cite the distress it 
causes the victim by saying something like 'it hurts him.' In contrast, psychopathic 
individuals are far less likely to give victim's welfare justifications; in fact, they are more 
likely than control subjects to give normative justifications than control subjects, e.g. by 
saying 'it's wrong to X' (Blair 1995). This indicates that the root problem with 
psychopaths’ difficulty with the moral/conventional distinction is not necessarily their 
inability to generate judgments of wrongness. Rather, their reduced ability to consider 
and react to the distress of others, e.g. others' sadness and fearfulness, seems to be the 
pertinent causal factor behind psychopaths' poor performance in the moral/conventional 
task. Hence, the problem presents itself more so through their reduced ability to consider 
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and react to the distress of others, e.g. others' sadness and fearfulness, than it does 
through any general deficit in evaluative judgment or moral judgment, contrary to what 
emotions cognitivism predicts.  
Perhaps, then, psychopaths have a reduced ability to make judgments about the 
distress of others, i.e. they are less able to judge that someone else is sad or fearful. 
However, the data on this point is unclear. For example, a series of studies have tested 
psychopaths’ ability to categorize the emotional expressions of other people have 
produced inconsistent results. For instance, in one study, researchers found that 
psychopaths were able to categorize pictures of sad and fearful facial expressions equally 
well as non-psychopaths (Kosson et al.). In another study on psychopaths' ability to 
attribute complex mental states (e.g., doubtful, upset, insisting, despondent, etc.) to other 
people, researchers found no difference between psychopaths and control subjects 
(Richell et al.). However, in study on children with psychopathic tendencies, Blair et al. 
found that psychopathic children’s' ability to recognize both fearful and sad facial 
expressions is impaired compared to comparison children (2001). Upon running the very 
same facial affect recognition experiment on psychopathic adults, however, Blair et al. 
found that psychopaths were less able than comparison individuals to recognize fearful, 
but not sad, facial expressions (2004). Despite these contradictory data, some authors 
have pieced together an interesting explanation 
 Firstly, why do psychopathic children perform more poorly on facial recognition 
tasks than psychopathic adults? One prominent explanation for this discrepancy points to 
a possible root cause for psychopathy. In non-psychopathic individuals, the processing 
and recognition of sad and fearful expressions involves recruiting certain sub-cortical 
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systems in the brain, especially the amygdala. Psychopathic individuals have reduced 
amygdala volume, and show reduced amygdala activation when processing sad and 
fearful expressions (Blair et al. 2005, 116). Thus, while psychopathic children are likely 
initially impaired in their ability to recognize sad and fearful expressions because of their 
amygdala deficiency, it has been suggested that psychopathic adults have been able to 
learn to compensate for their deficiency over time by recruiting other areas of the brain to 
help process this data, namely, cortical areas.  
Now, when the brain relies on areas of the cerebral cortex, or cortical areas, to 
compute information, those processes tend to be slow, effortful, and time consuming. In 
addition, the cortex implements high-level cognitive processes such as language, 
reasoning, thinking, and consciousness. In contrast, when the brain relies on sub-cortical 
systems to compute information, these processes are quick and efficient, and they tend to 
occur automatically. Automatic processes are typically defined by the following criteria: 
"An automatic process is one that (a) can operate efficiently, (b) occurs without 
awareness, and (c) is difficult to control" (Blair, I. et al. 764). 
Another look at the inconsistent data shows an important pattern. When adult 
psychopathic individuals are given an easy facial identification task (e.g. Kosson et al.), 
or are given ample time to respond to a facial identification task (Richell et al.), they 
perform equally well as, if not better than, comparison individuals. In the first case, 
because the task was not overly demanding, the subject’s cognitive resources were able to 
compensate for their amygdala deficiency. In the second case, because the subject was 
allowed to complete the experiment at his own pace, his cognitive resources again would 
not have been strained, and he would have been able to compensate. On the other hand, 
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in Blair et al.’s 2004 study, when the subject’s cognitive resources were strained by the 
difficulty of that task and precise time constraints, the psychopathic subjects were slightly 
slower to identify others’ fearful facial expressions as fearful, but, in contrast to 
psychopathic children, they showed no significant difficulty with sad faces. In fact, 
because the psychopaths were slower in identifying fearful facial expressions, and slow 
processing is a hallmark of cortical processing, this supports the idea that psychopaths are 
utilizing higher-level cognitive processes in order to discriminate between different 
emotional facial expressions.   
So, it seems that while adult psychopaths do show some impairment when 
recognizing fearful facial expressions, they are able to correct for the more prominent 
deficiencies found in psychopathic children by learning to recruit cortical processing 
structures to make those distinctions. In other words, psychopaths have to rely on areas of 
the brain associated with reasoning, language, and high-level thinking to complete this 
task, which are just the areas of the brain that would be involved in making evaluative 
propositions, and which, presumably, emotions cognitivists would propose play an 
important role in eliciting the feelings associated with affective responses. However, 
adult psychopaths still present with reduced affective responses to the fearfulness and 
sadness of others, which presents a problem for Darwall et al. insofar as they rely on a 
heavily cognitivist theory of the emotions. For, psychopaths present with no general 
impairment in their ability to make high-level evaluative propositions despite amygdala 
dysfunction. Although they can still understand that a person's face expresses sadness, or 
that hitting another person is bad because it is wrong, etc., they remain impeded in their 
ability to generate genuine felt affective responses. 
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Indeed, the problem with psychopaths does not lie in their high-level cognitive 
systems, but in the low-level, automatic, sub-cortical cognitive systems involved in 
eliciting what are properly called emotional, or affective, responses (Zhu and Thagard 
29).11 Now, in some way the processes that these sub-cortical structures implement are 
involved in making crude appraisals of stimuli that occur causally prior to felt responses 
(Zhu and Thagard 27-29). In other words, one of the sub-cortical process that elicits felt 
emotional responses 'decides' whether some stimulus is 'good' or 'bad' for the organism. 
Because we have seen that high-level evaluative propositions do not help explain felt 
affective response, perhaps instead we can try to understand these automatic 'appraisals' 
as the evaluative judgments in question, as they are involved in an explanation of 
affective response.  
Now, automatic appraisals of emotional information understood in this way neither 
present themselves propositionally nor do they appear to be executed in a propositional 
fashion, which means that they do not resemble propositional, evaluative judgments. 
There are two main reasons for making these claims. The first points out that the way 
these appraisals seem to present their 'results' for conscious processing is primarily in the 
form of felt affective response. The second involves the processes that instantiate these 
appraisals. The relevant sub-cortical processes do not seem to reason that 'is a threat' or 'is 
morally blameworthy' are proper predicates for some stimulus. Rather, they are more like 
systems that simply respond in a certain ways to certain stimuli, thereby resulting in a felt 
                                                                          
11 Even though I refer to these sub-cortical processes as 'cognitive,' it is important to realize that they are still automatic 
and intuitive. When we are talking about a psychological process, saying that it is 'cognitive' is usually only intended to 
mean that it involves information processing, whether it is affect-based or non-affect-based (see Blair J. 67). We cannot 
take the word 'cognitive' here as being opposed to 'emotional,' as one might be naturally inclined to think, because both 
types of process involve information processing. 
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affective response, which in turn can cause an evaluative judgment to be made.12 In other 
words, these appraisals do not directly render propositional, evaluative judgments in any 
traditional sense. 
To summarize, the evidence garnered from an examination of several studies on 
psychopaths suggests that high-level cognitive processes are not required for the 
generation of what are properly thought of as emotional responses, as emotions 
cognitivism, and especially emotions judgmentalism, would predict. Rather, low-level, 
sub-cortical cognitive processes are implicated in the generation of genuine affective 
responses. Psychopaths present with a significant deficit in this system (specifically, in 
the amygdala) which causes them to be far less emotionally responsive to the sadness and 
fearfulness of others when compared to control subjects. These sub-cortical processes, at 
one point or another, involve making appraisals of emotional information, and these 
processes do elicit felt affective response. However, these appraisals do not resemble 
evaluative judgments in any traditional sense. Clearly, though, such appraisals are very 
relevant to explaining affective responses and the judgments that people base on them, as 
they are causally prior to felt affective reactions (Zhu and Thagard 27).  
Given all this, it is a gross oversimplification to say that we need to understand 
judgments of wrongness before we can understand moral disapproval. First, with regard 
to psychopaths, it seems that rather than talking about their emotional deficit in terms of 
'feelings of moral disapproval,' we should be talking in terms of emotional responsiveness 
to the emotional states and distress of others.13 Second, if we concentrate on the affective 
                                                                          
12 It is of course perfectly reasonable to talk about these systems 'categorizing' or 'appraising' something as a threat, for 
example. But this is more a manner of speaking than an actual description of what these systems are doing, I would 
think. 
13 Of course, there are other morally relevant emotions, e.g., guilt, anger, etc. 
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responses that are caused by the distress of others, it does not seem that any kind of 
evaluative judgment, traditionally conceived, is involved in eliciting those responses; 
instead, the closest thing to evaluative judgments that could be said to elicit such 
responses is some kind of automatic appraisal. Therefore, for at least one class of morally 
relevant affective responses (i.e. reactions to the distress of others), it is not apparent that 
evaluative propositions perform any significant role in eliciting those affective responses. 
Hence it is not apparent that they can explain the moral judgments that people make on 
the basis of those responses, as Darwall et al. claim in their objection.  
At this point, there are two further problems that need addressing. First, there still 
remains the fact that automatic, sub-cortical appraisals are indeed implicated in the 
elicitation of affective response, and that in order to understand moral judgments based 
on those responses, we still have to understand automatic appraisals – concentrating on 
felt affect as a causal explanation of moral judgments is still not a worthwhile exercise. 
Secondly, I have not yet talked about the voluntary, evaluative judgments that people do 
in fact make in order to regulate their affective responses.  
With regard to the first problem, because automatic appraisals occur unconsciously 
and involuntarily, whereas the affective response that these appraisals result in is felt 
consciously and is thus clearly more relevant to voluntarily passing judgment, it seems 
that the part of this process that is most relevant to the moral judgments we consciously 
and voluntarily make is the conscious feelings and motivational pushes and pulls 
associated with affective responses. Despite the fact that unconscious cognitive appraisals 
are plainly relevant to giving an objective explanation of moral judgments, such 
appraisals are hardly relevant from the perspective of the person trying to make 
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normative moral judgments, or so it would seem.  
Now what about appraisals that are made voluntarily and propositionally, for 
determining future affective responses and behaviour? In other words, what about the 
judgments that we explicitly make regarding regulating our affective responses? Now, if 
a person voluntarily judges that some affective response is unjustified in relation to some 
object or state of affairs, we cannot just say that since this person has made a cognitive 
judgment that is supposed to determine future affective responses and behaviour, 
affective response does not play an explanatory role in the original judgment. Consider 
the following example. Sarah, who owns a coffee shop, has recently decided that she is 
conflicted about the positive affective response she feels when she makes a good profit, 
because she knows that the coffee beans she uses are grown by Latin American farmers 
who work as de facto slaves, thereby suffering greatly partly so that she can sell cheap 
coffee. In this case, because she bases her judgment on her aversion to the suffering of 
others, which she thinks just is the result of having negative affective responses to the 
suffering of others, affective response does indeed play an explanatory role in her 
judgment, for that is what motivates her to decide that she can no longer feel happy when 
she makes a good profit. 
To summarize, if the cognitive appraisal that causes an affective response is made 
unconsciously and involuntarily, it does not resemble a judgment of wrongness 
traditionally conceived. Also, it seems that it is not unconscious appraisals that matter to 
people when they make normative moral judgments, but rather the feeling that these 
appraisals cause. On the other hand, if a person consciously makes a cognitive appraisal 
of some affective response that is intended to change his future affective responses, it is 
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quite possible that his appraisal was based on some other affective response. 
Explaining the Normativity of Affective Response 
In the foregoing section, I briefly argued that while the involuntary, unconscious 
appraisals that determine affective responses certainly are relevant to giving an 
explanation of how an affective response is implicated in an explanatory account of 
moral judgment, the feeling and motivational efficaciousness associated with affective 
response is what is relevant to the person actually making a normative moral judgment. 
Surely, though, if we know this, should we not take those involuntary appraisals more 
seriously when voluntarily rendering normative moral judgments, as they are, in some 
sense, the root cause of those judgments? The idea here is that when someone is making a 
moral judgment, instead of doing so on the basis of those aspects of his affective 
responses that surface in conscious experience, he should focus on the appraisals that 
actually cause the conscious aspects of affective response, and factor them into his 
decisions. I will argue that appraisals of this nature provide poor material for discussing 
and evaluating normative moral judgments.  
There are a number of problems with this line of reasoning. For, if we are going to 
base our moral judgments on the automatic appraisals that cause affective response, we 
have to be able to, in some way, analyze those appraisals to see how they can help us in 
making normative moral judgments. We would have to know what basis there is for those 
appraisals, i.e., in what 'terms' these appraisals are made, or, 'why' they are made. This 
would be a difficult task. The operations of automatic processes are not consciously 
accessible, in other words, they are inaccessible from the first-person perspective (Haidt 
6). Because they are not consciously accessible, we are only aware of the results of 
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automatic processes like these, not the processes themselves – we are aware of the affect 
and not the underlying appraisal. When appraisals are consciously made (i.e., when they 
are proper judgments meant to regulate one's future affective responses), their relevance 
to making moral judgments is relatively obvious. Consequently, in the interesting case, 
we cannot analyze these appraisals from the first person perspective. 
The other option, then, is to try to analyze involuntary appraisals from the third 
person perspective. We could to try to understand them as systems or processes 
implemented in the brain. We could analyze them as neural systems or as systems picked 
for by natural selection. If we try to understand them as neural systems, the relevance of 
having this understanding to making normative moral judgments is only partial. Consider 
an example. Steve is wondering whether his feeling of moral outrage toward Guy is 
justified, and he is wondering whether knowing more about his unconscious appraisal 
process will help him to decide. The only advice neuroscience could give him would 
recommend that he does not commit an error by saying, for instance, that his moral 
outrage is justified by the fact that his automatic appraisals are rendered by automatic 
processes that make decisions according to the categorical imperative, as this would be an 
incorrect analysis of these appraisals (e.g. because they do not appear to make decisions 
in terms of the categorical imperative).  
If we proceeded to tell Steve that when he feels outrage, this or that area of the brain 
is active, that the neurons involved release certain types of neuro-transmitters, that the 
process is automatic and intuitive, and so on, this information would not be relevant to 
whether his moral outrage is justified, as they would just be descriptions of how his 
feeling comes about. He is asking if he should continue to feel that way, and whether he 
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should pass judgment on the basis of that feeling. Neuroscience only tells us how we 
should not analyze our unconscious appraisals. Consequently, it shows us how we should 
not try to use them as justification, and it does not show us how they might be relevant to 
making normative moral judgments.   
At this point we turn to evolutionary accounts that explain why we make the 
automatic appraisals that we do, to see whether they can provide us with a way to 
profitably analyze them. As an example of this type of account, neurobiologist Joseph 
LeDoux offers a reasonable description of the evolutionary advantage of automatic fear 
responses: "From the point of view of survival, it is better to respond to potentially 
dangerous events as if they were in fact the real thing than to fail to respond. The cost of 
treating a stick as a snake is less, in the long run, than the cost of treating a snake as a 
stick" (LeDoux 165.; cited in Zhu and Thagard 29). The appraisals that cause morally 
relevant affective responses are amendable to the same type of account. In effect, we 
make the (morally relevant) appraisals that we do because making them increases our 
ability to survive and reproduce. In this way, we can analyze our unconscious appraisals 
as products of natural selection. 
With the foregoing in mind, if we try to understand the kind of cognitive appraisal 
that produces conscious emotional experiences, which is supposed to help us better 
understand how we should justify our affective responses, we can use an evolutionary 
account. If we apply this kind of account to Steve’s case, we find that it is overly general, 
and that it likely conflicts with his own normative aims. For, we could only tell him that 
an appraisal process that was selected for elicited his feeling of moral outrage, which tells 
him that for the most part his episodes of moral outrage tend to be fitness enhancing. It 
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does not tell him much about his specific situation, i.e. it tells him nothing about whether 
Guy has committed a moral transgression. Also, Steve likely rejects the claim that 
evolutionary accounts of his automatic appraisals grant them any kind of normative 
authority – he might think that there are more important things than evolutionary fitness. 
Christine Korsgaard makes this point well: "as a moral agent, you might decide that 
moral claims, if they are made on you in the name of the preservation of the species, are 
unjustified" (54). 
What would be important to Steve is the phenomenological presence and 
motivational efficacy of his affective response (because that his how he consciously 
accesses emotional information), whether his information is reliable, etc. So, if we want 
to understand normative moral judgments in terms of affective response, we should not 
turn to the automatic cognitive appraisals which we can explain in neurological or 
evolutionary terms, but rather to the phenomenological presence and motivational 
efficacy that accompany affective responses, as they are the most relevant factors to the 
individual pondering a decision. As I concluded in the last chapter, these aspects of 
affective response just are the aspects that are pertinent to an analysis of the normativity 
of affective responses.14    
Therefore, if we want to explain the normativity of moral judgments made in terms of 
affective response, we cannot turn to evolutionary accounts of the reasons why we make 
the automatic appraisals (which, remember, are also implicated in affective response) that 
                                                                          
14 My original inspiration for these claims comes from an argument made by Christine Korsgaard: "The question how 
we explain moral judgment is a third-person, theoretical question, a question about why a certain species of intelligent 
animals behaves in a certain way. The normative question is a first-person question that arises for the moral agent who 
must do what morality says" (16). While this sounds right, it does seem that third-person accounts are important to 
normative accounts because they tell us what justifications we should not give for taking something as normative. It 
excludes us from relying on justifications that are untrue, for example, that the appraisals we make are justified because 
they are made according to the categorical imperative – assuming that something’s falsity is a salient first-person 
reason not to rely on it as a justification. 
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we do. Evolutionary accounts of affective response simply do not provide people with 
good enough reasons to accept their responses as conferring normativity. 
Conclusion   
The primary function of the first half of this chapter was to work out how it is that 
people can make moral judgments without feeling, or when they think they have lost any 
disposition to feeling. I also briefly explained that people who actually have lost all 
disposition to feel toward something can still make what appear to be moral judgments 
about that thing, although these judgments would probably be understood by such people 
more so as conventional rather than moral rules (where this is understood in terms of the 
conventional/moral psychological distinction). 
The second half was mostly dedicated to a close analysis of the relationship between 
evaluative judgment and affective response through a discussion of the emotional deficit 
associated with psychopathy. There we found that the emotions cognitivism that Darwall 
et al. describe in their objection provides a gross oversimplification of the issues, and that 
we it is probably not appropriate to explain affective responses in terms of evaluative, 
propositional judgments. In the second half, I discussed the automatic appraisals that 
cause affective response, and how these appraisals are not like traditional (moral) 
judgments, and how they provide very little by way of positive normative guidance. 
There we found, as we did in the first chapter, that the phenomenological presence and 
motivational efficacy associated with affective response are more important to a 
discussion of whether affective responses can be justified as reasons for normative moral 
judgment.  
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Justification, Coherence, and a Modest Theory 
In the first chapter, I anticipated that the best method for justifying affective 
responses as reasons for normative moral judgments would be a suitably precise notion of 
coherence. This was largely because 'external' methods of justification of affective 
responses proved to be undesirable, which left us to try an 'internal' method, which is best 
thought of in terms of coherence. In addition, I argued that the phenomenological 
presence and motivational efficacy associated with affective responses make them prima 
facie normative, and as such they provide us with good starting points for establishing 
that certain affective responses can be granted full-blown normativity. The second 
chapter again established that it is these qualities of affective responses that are relevant 
to the agent trying to decide which normative moral judgments to make, while also 
showing that people can profitably think about their affective responses. As will become 
evident, these conclusions will prove to be crucial to establishing the viability of the 
following project.  
In this chapter, I will attempt to show how the notion of coherence can be used to 
develop a method for justifying individual affective responses. To do so, I will first 
closely examine Linda Radzik's paper "A Coherentist Theory of Normative Authority," 
which will help us better understand how the notion of coherence can perform as a 
normative function. As will soon become evident, Radzik has done some important 
groundwork with regard to showing how the notion of coherence can perform a 
normative role. Once armed with an understanding of how the notion of coherence can be 
applied to normative question, I will proceed to offer some suggestions on how to justify 
one’s individual affective responses as reasons for making normative moral judgments.  
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Normativity and Coherence 
Before an attempt to outline how the notion of coherence can be applied to affective 
responses can be productive, we should first examine Linda Radzik's recent formulation 
of a coherentist theory of normative authority, with the intent of developing more tools 
with which to outline a theory for justifying affective responses. Radzik main questions 
involve normative authority. What, she asks, makes an 'ought' claim authoritative? In 
other words, what makes an 'ought' claim normatively binding? She believes the answer 
lies in justification - 'ought' claims have normative authority if they have been justified in 
a certain way (24). According to Radzik, a justification of this sort must fulfill five 
conditions, four of which I will discuss.15 This type of justification must be: (a) first-
person accessible, (b) regress-avoiding, (c) reflexive, and (d) comprehensive. I will 
explain each of these conditions and their importance to any theory of justification in 
turn. More importantly, once I have gone through Radzik’s conditions and have briefly 
explained her theory, I will also examine how each of these conditions can be applied to 
our central question about justifying affective responses.16
The first condition that Radzik imposes on a normativity conferring justification is 
that it must be first person accessible. By this she means that the justification of an ought 
claim had better be convincing from the point of view of the agent who is evaluating this 
justification. If an agent is supposed do be bound by a normative claim, the reasons for 
that claim should be both convincing and accessible to that agent. In defense of this 
                                                                          
15 The reason for this is that two of the conditions, first person accessibility and transparency, are so similar that given 
our purposes we need not distinguish between them. In case the reader is curious about how these conditions interact, 
Radzik writes this about the transparency condition: "A norm cannot really be justified for an agent if, when she 
reflects on what it is that makes the norm justified, she can no longer endorse it" (29). 
16 Radzik speaks throughout her paper about coherence between norms. Although her central case is clearly different 
from ours (i.e., norms vs. affective responses) the theory she develops is amendable to the development of an account 
involving affective responses. 
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claim, Radzik writes, "whatever it is that makes morality binding on this agent had better 
be something she can grasp and appreciate the import of, otherwise her question [e.g., 
why should I be moral?] has not really been answered". Moreover, she argues that if our 
theory of justification is to be of any utility, it needs to be first-person accessible: "If 
thinking about normative authority is supposed to be of any use to me when I am trying 
to make choices, I had better be able to tell what is authoritative and what is not" (26).  
On this matter, I tend to agree with Radzik. Recall that in the last chapter I argued 
that evolutionary accounts of the implicit appraisals that cause felt affective responses are 
inadequate as normative justifications precisely because they are not convincing from the 
first person perspective. In addition, recall that this fact lead me to claim that it is the 
phenomenological presence and motivational efficacy implicit in affective responses that 
are relevant to trying to justify them, specifically because they are the elements of 
affective response that are accessible from the first person perspective. Indeed, it has 
been an underlying assumption throughout this paper that questions about the 
justification of affective response must be given an answer that is acceptable from the 
first person perspective.  
My primary reasons for making this assumption stem largely from arguments made 
by Christine Korsgaard. I agree with Korsgaard that questions about morality are best 
interpreted as questions asked from the first person perspective, and therefore that they 
deserve a first-person answer (14-17). She writes, "the question how we explain moral 
behaviour is a third person, theoretical question, a question about why a certain species of 
animals behaves in a certain way. The normative question is a first person question that 
arises for the moral agent who must do what morality says" (16). Unless the reasons why 
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a person ought to do something are at least somehow accessible to and motivating for that 
person, at least after they have reflected on and given serious thought to the matter, it is 
very difficult to see how they could possibly be reasons for that person.17 There are, of 
course, several complications involved in holding to this position - for instance, it seems 
that a person can have a genuine reason for acting of believing without knowing that he 
has that reason.18 As can be seen from the discussion in the preceding chapter about the 
cognitive appraisals that cause felt affective responses, and their lack of normative 
efficacy from the first person perspective, this seems particularly true when affective 
responses are under consideration.  
This view is motivated by the idea, shared by many ethical theorists, that normativity 
must somehow be grounded from within the perspectives of individual agents if 
normativity is going to find a place in the natural order of things (Darwall, 261). This 
idea often goes by the label 'internalism.' Within the literature, the word 'internalism' has 
been used to define several positions that ethical philosophers have taken up on issues 
such as moral judgments, motivation, and reasons.19 To be clear, the type of internalism 
that I am talking about in this paper is best understood as being about reasons. It requires 
that if there really is a reason for an agent to do or believe something, then that agent 
must be able to appreciate the force of that reason from her own perspective, where it is 
understood that the agent in question is (a) fully informed of all the relevant facts, and (b) 
is able to calmly reflect on the matter at hand (e.g., the agent is free of debilitating 
                                                                          
17 Bernard Williams offers strong arguments for thinking this way. See his "Internal and External Reasons." Of course, 
Williams and Korsgaard disagree quite a bit, but they seem to agree generally on the internalist intuition. 
18 For more on this and related issues, see Peter Railton's "Moral Realism." 
19 For further reading on the differences between various forms of internalism in ethics, see especially Stephen 
Darwall's "Internalism and Agency" and "Reasons, Motives, and the Demands of Morality." 
 52
pathologies or extreme practical irrationality). There is of course much to be said about 
ethical internalism in general, and the specific form of it that I have just discussed. 
Nonetheless, I ask the reader to be charitable on this point and to allow me to continue 
making the assumption that reasons must be in principle accessible to agents from the 
first person perspective. 
The second condition is that our method of justification avoids regress. It is easy to 
see how regress could infect a justificatory theory, and like Radzik, I believe that 
avoiding regress is important. For, I could justify my judging that stealing is wrong by 
saying ‘stealing is wrong because causing other people harm is wrong, and stealing harms 
other people.’ The next question, though, is whether my judgment that 'causing other 
people harm is wrong' is itself justified. I could now say that 'harming people causes pain, 
and causing pain is wrong.' But then I would have to justify this last claim,  . . . , and so 
on. Radzik's suggestion for solving this problem is to apply the notion of coherence to 
justification. According to her, a norm "will be justified if and only if it coheres well with 
the norms he accepts" (30). Thinking about justification this way helps avoid regress 
because "justifying reasons are provided for each norm, though the set of norms is finite 
and no norm is taken as justified in itself" (30). While I have more to say about avoiding 
regress, I will reserve those comments for later. 
The third condition is comprehensiveness. Radzik notes that there are many different 
kinds of narrow justification: prudential justification, epistemic justification, moral 
justification, and so on. She calls these 'interest-driven' types of justification, presumably 
because each tends to be fairly parochial in its aims, and none of these types of 
justification seems to capture the notion of normative authority simpliciter; indeed, 
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sometimes one or another of these interest-driven justifications (or, rather, theorists who 
defend them) might claim normative authority over the others, as morality is often 
thought to do. To help avoid these problems, she argues, we need a different kind of 
justification: justification simpliciter. She writes:  
If normative authority is really a matter of justification, it must be a very 
different kind of justification than the interest-driven ones. It must be 
justification from some more comprehensive point of view - a point of 
view from which we can look over all the interest-defined evaluative 
schemes and judge which ones should be allowed influence over our 
choices. Normative authority needs to be characterized in terms of an all-
things-considered sort of justification. (27-28).  
Clearly, as we are talking about a very narrow form of justification, namely, justifying 
affective response(s) as reasons for normative moral judgments, we need to see how this 
narrow from of justification might fare in relation to Radzik's overall scheme. Before we 
can do that, though, we should first investigate the rest of Radzik's conditions and her 
coherentist theory of normative authority in more detail.  
The fourth condition is reflexivity. If we are going to come up with a theory of 
justification simpliciter, we need to be justified in accepting that that theory of 
justification itself. Radzik puts it this way: "It must be the case that the alleged standard 
of justification passes its own test" (31). This condition stems from the 
comprehensiveness and regress-avoiding conditions. For, if our standard of justification 
did not pass its own test, it would not be comprehensive, as there would be norms whose 
justification is left unaccounted for. Also, it would not avoid regress, for we could always 
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ask if we are justified in accepting certain norms as justified simpliciter. Thus, she 
proposes that a theory of justification simpliciter should be self-justifying.  
Radzik claims to have developed a theory that meets all these conditions. With these 
conditions in place, her first step is to define when a norm has been reflectively endorsed: 
"A norm that is 'reflectively endorsed' is one that is both accepted itself and supported by 
something else that the agent accepts" (32). One norm supports another when the latter 
norm satisfies the standard set out by the former norm. For instance, the norm 'do not hit 
your younger brother' is supported by the norm 'do not harm other people,' because not 
hitting one's younger brother is a form of not harming other people.   
Moving on, she calls her theory Reflective Endorsement Coherentism, and she 
defines it in the following way:  
REC: A norm is decisively justified for an agent if she would endorse it 
upon reflection and that endorsement would be ultimately undefeated by 
the rest of her acceptance set. (32) 
However, REC is itself in need of justification, so as to satisfy the comprehensiveness 
condition. Radzik sees RE1 as a kind of restatement of the idea behind REC: 
RE1: One ought to accept the norms that one would endorse upon 
reflection.  
Working from this restatement, Radzik claims that an agent could justify RE1 by appeal 
to RE2, which is quite similar to both REC and RE1: 
RE2: I ought to accept the norms of reflection that I do. (34) 
So, if I think to myself 'why should I accept the norms that I do?', I can answer my 
question by reference to RE1: 'One ought to accept the norms that one would endorse 
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upon reflection.' If I ask myself 'why ought one accept norms that one would reach upon 
reflection?', I can answer my question by analogy to my own case, which just is a 
reference to RE2: 'I ought to accept the norms of reflection that I do.' With regard to the 
reflexivity condition, REC can be restated as RE1, the reason for accepting RE1 is RE2, 
and the reason for accepting RE2 is RE1 (34). In this way, the theory appears to fulfill the 
reflexivity condition; along with Radzik, we will refer to it as the 'loop of reflective 
endorsement.' Each of RE1 and RE2 accounts for the justification of the other.  This 'loop 
of reflective endorsement' also meets the comprehensiveness condition, as it covers all 
conceivable kinds of interest-driven norms - any norm a person could confidently accept 
upon reflection passes this test. In addition, it avoids regress - recall that because this 
theory invokes coherence, each norm is justified by other norms that have been justified 
upon reflection, the set of norms is finite, and no norm is taken to be justified on its own. 
Therefore, any query regarding the justification of a norm can be answered by citing 
other norms that the person in question has accepted, and because that set is finite, 
eventually the justifications will stop - presumably with the ‘loop of reflective 
endorsement’ RE1 and RE2.  
 With regard to the first condition that we discussed, the first-person accessibility 
requirement, the verdict is mixed. Radzik makes a good point that if an agent does not 
accept REC, and consequently rejects RE1 and RE2, it seems that she does not trust her 
own powers of judgment, and therefore ceases to be an agent in some important sense. 
Indeed, this reasoning does lead one to think that REC must be both be understood and 
appreciated by any reasonable agent.  
However, remember that the purpose of this paper is to inquire whether we can justify 
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affective responses as reasons for making normative moral judgments. Now, if a person 
asks the question 'should I accept that affective response provides justifying reasons for 
holding to the normative moral judgments that I make?', it is hard to see how appealing to 
REC would be of any help. Indeed, if our worry is narrowly justification of affective 
response, then simply being told to accept whatever conclusions we reach through 
reflection does us no good, because doing so begs the question that our reflective 
methods for evaluating affective responses are indeed reliable and themselves justifiable. 
Appealing to RE1 or RE2 when asking the question 'does my anger at X provide a 
justifying reason for judging that X is wrong?' provides little information about whether 
one is justified in judging that X is wrong. It might help us once we have reached a 
decision about the matter, but until then, we need first to develop methods for reflecting 
on affective responses. 
Given these considerations, it seems that REC is in some sense lacking by way of 
comprehensiveness, insofar as it does offer an acceptable account of justification within 
the narrow, interest-driven types of justification. For our purposes, what this shows is that 
we need to work out moral justification before we can consider justification simpliciter. 
This next section, then, is dedicated to applying the outline of Radzik's coherenist theory 
of justification to our more modest goal of showing how affective responses might be 
given a coherentist form of justification.  
Justification, Coherence, and Affective Response    
Before developing the outlines of a theory for a coherentist justification of affective 
responses, let's first take another look at Radzik's conditions, to see which of them should 
constrain our theorizing. For the sake of exposition, I will begin with those that do not 
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present major constraints as far as we are concerned, followed by those that should 
constrain the theory. After the constraining conditions are in place, I will use a few 
examples in an attempt to show how an affective response could be justified as a reason 
for a normative moral judgment.  
First, with regard to the comprehensiveness condition, because this theory of 
justification is intended to be a narrowly about affective responses and basing moral 
judgments on them, it does not seem that it needs to be comprehensive. Subsequently, 
because the reflexivity condition is largely a result of requiring comprehensiveness, as 
described above, it will not be a concern either. As I develop the theory, though, I will 
have something to say about how moral justification relates to other interest-driven kinds 
of justification, and, if space and time permit, how it relates to justification simpliciter. 
Second, it is a given that our theory has to be first-person accessible. Indeed, this 
condition already grounded the reasoning in chapter two that motivated taking the 
phenomenological presence and motivational efficacy that accompany affective response 
as the elements of affective response that are relevant to justifying them. Because it is 
these elements of affective response that are accessible to the first person perspective, it 
will be these elements that will prove relevant to testing affective responses for 
coherence.  
Third, it does seem that our theory should avoid regress. Given this, however, it also 
seems that there is a difference between avoiding regress and giving our justifications 
'unshakeable foundations,' or even having them terminate in a loop of reflective 
endorsement, as is the case in Radzik's theory. Now, in the coherentist theory of 
justification that I will develop, nothing will be beyond question - all conclusions reached 
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regarding justification will be in principle defeasible. So, while any conclusion reached 
will always be in danger of being overturned, and thus could be subject to endless 
demands requiring that we test to see if it still is justified, these are not the types of 
question that threaten regress. Let me explain.  
Recall that I argued in chapter one that affective responses are to a very real extent 
self-justifying just in virtue of their phenomenological presence and motivational 
efficacy. This suggests that justifying an affective response is not going to be a matter of 
saying that it is justified because it has positive support by some other affective response 
that is already been granted 'full' justification. Instead, justifying an affective response 
will be more a matter of seeing whether any other affective response(s) (each of which, 
remember, carries its own level of self-justification) conflicts with the phenomenological 
or, more importantly, motivational tendencies of the original affective response, insofar 
as they relate to making moral judgments. Justifying an affective response will not 
require that other, already justified affective responses provide it with positive support. 
Remember, regress threatens when we justify one thing in terms of another, and then ask 
what the latter thing is itself justified in terms of, . . . , and so on. Because the theory I 
will develop below will not justify affective responses 'in terms of' anything else, the 
regress problem, while certainly a condition we have to fulfill, does not seem to present a 
pressing concern.  
At this point, the best way to proceed is to introduce an example to work through. 
Recall from chapter two the story about Sarah, who owns a coffee shop. Sarah has 
recently become conflicted about the positive affective response she feels when she 
makes a good profit, because she knows that the coffee beans she uses are grown by 
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Latin American farmers who work as de facto slaves, thereby suffering greatly partly so 
that she can sell cheap coffee. Knowing that others have suffered partly so that she can 
sell cheap coffee causes Sarah to have a negative affective response towards the profits 
she makes - in other words, she feels guilty. On the basis of this feeling, Sarah is tempted 
to judge that her making the profits that she does is wrong, on account of the fact that it 
perpetuates the suffering of others. Would she be justified in making this judgment based 
on her negative affective response to making profits?  
 In chapter one, I argued that affective responses are largely self-justifying as reasons 
for making normative moral judgments, simply because of their phenomenological 
presence and motivational efficacy. However, I also argued that this very quality of 
affective responses can lead us astray, as when a feeling of disgust causes people to make 
hasty moral judgments based on unjustified affective responses. As applied to Sarah's 
case, her just having a negative affective response toward her own profits does provide a 
prima facie justified reason for judging that her making profits is wrong. However, she 
should not make a hasty judgment. The first thing she should do before beginning to 
evaluate whether her affective response is justified is calm herself. She first needs to get 
to the point where she is not overrun by emotion by making a conscious effort to regulate 
her response. Therefore, it seems that the first thing that a person needs to do when 
attempting to justify an affective response, then, is to regulate her emotional state. In 
Pierre Phillipot's terms (see chapter two, section two), in doing this one would be 
regulating one’s 'schema' activation so that one only gets what emotional information one 
thinks one needs from it.  
Once Sarah is calm, she needs to see if there are any other affective responses that she 
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might have that 'conflict' with her original affective response. Needless to say, before we 
can give Sarah any advice, we need an explanation of how two affective responses could 
'conflict' with each other, or, in other words, how they could cohere or incohere with each 
other. At first glance, affective responses taken alone do not seem to cohere or incohere 
with each other. If I am happy at getting accepted to the graduate school of my choice, 
and subsequently angry at my best friend, those responses do not seem to cohere or 
incohere. Feeling happy at one point and angry at another does not seem to entail that 
there is any coherence-type relationship between the two emotions. It seems that affective 
responses need a common object to cohere or incohere, i.e., if I felt both happy and sad 
toward the same object. The way to get around this is to say that if an agent has two or 
more discrete affective responses caused by the same stimulus or sufficiently similar 
stimuli, that person has potentially conflicting affective responses toward that stimulus(i).   
With this in place, I propose that for the moment we understand both coherence and 
incoherence relationships between the elements defined above through phenomenological 
feel and motivational efficacy. Taking these aspects of affective response to be the ones 
that are relevant to justification is in line with our first-person accessibility requirement. 
With regard to the different phenomenological 'feelings' associated with different 
affective responses, and how they can cohere or not, I will talk about affective responses 
being phenomenologically 'positive' or 'negative' in relation to their object(s). For 
example, feeling happy at some object would be positive, and feeling disgusted or angry 
at the same object would be negative. Let's presume that if two affective responses are 
both either phenomenologically 'positive' or 'negative' they prima facie cohere, and if one 
is 'positive' and the other 'negative' they prima facie incohere. 
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With regard to motivational efficacy, I mean narrowly the motivational push that an 
affective response might have that would terminate in a person to rendering a certain 
moral judgment. Once again, we will talk about affective responses being 'positive' or 
'negative.' For instance, when a person feels guilty because he has stolen from his friend, 
his guilt would motivate him to judge that his actions were morally wrong. An affective 
response like this would be considered 'negative.' On the other hand, if a person feels 
happy that another person is helping alleviate the suffering of others, that person would 
be motivated to judge that that person's actions are morally right. An affective response 
like this would be considered 'positive.' 
Returning to Sarah's case, it seems that she does have conflicting responses. For, 
although she feels guilty about making a profit, she also feels happy at making a profit. 
Given that the phenomenological feels associated with these two emotions conflict it 
would seems that these two responses are incoherent, from which it should follow that 
Sarah's guilt is not justified as a reason for making a moral judgment. However, do they 
conflict motivationally, in the sense defined above? In other words, should Sarah's 
happiness recommend bear any relevance to making a moral judgment? 
Developing a principled method for distinguishing between morally relevant and 
irrelevant emotions in all cases would not be an easy task, and it is not one that I will 
endeavor to accomplish in full. Nonetheless, I think that we can distinguish between 
morally relevant and irrelevant emotions at least one important sense, which will at least 
allow us to deal with Sarah's case. 
In chapter one, I discussed the psychological distinction between moral and 
conventional norms while describing Shaun Nichols' argument against moral objectivity. 
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While in that discussion I emphasized the difference between this distinction in terms of 
authority contingency because of it's obvious bearing on moral objectivity, here I will 
emphasize another difference: the presence or absence of victims. Moral transgressions, 
as defined by the moral/conventional psychological distinction, always involve harming a 
person in some way, whereas conventional transgressions involve violating the social 
order by departing from the standard behavioural patters that structure social interactions 
(Blair, "Neuro-Cognitive Systems" 14). Again, I do not want to make the claim that, all 
psychological distinctions aside, all norms that a person could properly call moral norms 
necessarily involve prohibiting harming other people in some way (i.e., there might be 
moral norms about harming animals, or about promoting the welfare of others). However, 
I think it is at least fair to say that a very important subset does in fact prohibit harming 
others, and for the sake of simplicity and getting to the point, I will work only from 
within this subset.  
With this in mind, I propose that for the remainder of this paper we understand an 
emotion to be relevant to rendering moral judgments if it directly involves harming others 
or norms that prohibiting harming others, where 'harming others' indicates causing 
someone either physical or substantial economic harm that results in greatly reduced 
well-being of the victim (there are, of course, other kinds of harm, e.g., psychological 
harm). Thus, guilt is a relevant emotion if a person feels that way for harming another 
person; happiness is a relevant emotion if a person is happy because a stranger stopped a 
thug from stealing her purse, and so on.  
Let's return once more to Sarah's case. She has two discrete feelings toward her 
making profits: she feels guilt on the one hand, and happiness on the other. Her guilt is 
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clearly a morally relevant emotion, as she feels guilty specifically because Latin 
American farmers suffer greatly partly so that she can buy cheap coffee. Does her 
happiness pass the same test? Well, let's say that she feels happy because making money 
allows her to live well and save for early retirement.20 In this case, her emotion is not 
morally relevant, as it does not relate to harming others, nor does it relate to norms 
against harming others. Indeed, she seems to be having a positive emotional response to 
making money specifically because it is in her self-interest.  
So, it would seem that Sarah should come to the conclusion that her guilt is justified 
as a reason for judging that her making profits is wrong, because her happiness is not 
motivationally relevant to making moral judgments. Now that Sarah has reached a 
conclusion about whether she is justified or not, perhaps we can formalize the method 
whereby she reached that conclusion.  
To do so, I will discuss and reformulate two of Radzik's more important statements 
regarding her theory of Reflective Endorsement Coherentism. She makes two main 
claims: one that tells us when a norm is reflectively endorsed, and another that tells us 
when it is justified. First, "a norm that is 'reflectively endorsed' is one that is both 
accepted itself and supported by something else that they agent accepts" (32). Second, "a 
norm is decisively justified for an agent if she would endorse it upon reflection and that 
endorsement would be ultimately undefeated by the rest of her acceptance set" (32). Let's 
apply these two claims to our case.  
With regard to 'reflective endorsement,' there are two pertinent aspects of Radzik's 
statement. First, there is the issue of an affective response being supported by another as 
                                                                          
20 In addition, let's assume that she has other employment options, does not support a family, and would not suffer an 
inordinate amount by changing her business practices, etc. 
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a condition for receiving endorsement. In chapters one and two, I argued that our 
affective responses are prima facie self-justifying just in virtue of their phenomenological 
presence and motivational efficacy. In addition, in my discussion of regress, I argued that 
this leads to the conclusion that we do not need to justify our affective responses in terms 
of anything else, just because affective responses just are prima facie normatively 
compelling. Therefore, we do not need our affective responses to be supported positively 
by any other already justified responses; rather, what we are looking for in testing for 
coherence in this context is testing for whether there are any reasons not to make a 
judgment based on a certain affective response. This means that the type of coherence we 
are talking about is not the broad type that is associated with, for example, the Rawlsian 
idea of 'wide reflective equilibrium,' but rather is a very narrow and localized conception 
of coherence. Second, there is the issue of something's being 'accepted itself.' Again, 
relying on the prima facie self-justifying and normative nature of affective responses, we 
can say that affective responses come with a certain level of acceptance.21
With regard to Radzik's formal statement of REC, we can now reformulate it for our 
purposes as the Formula for the Justification of Affective Responses (FJAR):  
An affective response is decisively justified as a reason for making a 
normative moral judgment for an agent if there are no other motivationally 
relevant affective responses that conflict (incohere) with it, where 
'motivationally relevant' means that the response in question motivates the 
agent to make a conflicting moral judgment.  
 This principle is fairly simple: if you initially have an affective response that suggests 
                                                                          
21 To make an analogy, this level of acceptance on its own is something like the data priority that coherentist theories of 
empirical justification theories often invoke; see for example Thagard’s “Coherence: the Price is Right.” 
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making a moral judgment, unless you have another affective response that recommends 
making a conflicting moral judgment, then the original response is justified as a 
normative basis for making the moral judgment that it recommends.  
An obvious objection looms at this point: FJAR cannot resolve motivational conflicts 
that do arise between affective responses. For instance, if a person does have 
motivationally conflicting affective responses, FJAR only tells her that she should not 
render a normative moral judgment; it gives no advice on how to resolve this conflict.  
In lieu of resolving this problem, I will only tease out one possible response. We 
could reply by developing a hierarchical system that would rank the types of 
motivationally relevant affective responses as more or less motivationally relevant, which 
could help to resolve many conflicts. In this system, for instance, affective responses that 
are caused by the distress of another person could ‘trump’ affective responses that would 
motivate one to judge that it is permissible to harm someone in order to promote the 
welfare of another person. Thus, for example, if one was conflicted about whether to steal 
a substantial amount from another person in order to send one’s child to university, one 
would come to the conclusion that doing so would be wrong. However, a methodology 
like this would not be able to resolve conflicts between affective responses of the same 
type, e.g. between two affective responses that are caused by the distress of others. In this 
case, the only advice I can currently conjure up would be to ‘trust your gut,’ or simply to 
withhold judgment. Developing this hierarchical system could help with some cases, but 
again, in many difficult circumstances, the advice it would give would not be very 
compelling.  
Despite the current shortcomings of FJAR, it does provide justification for many of 
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the things that all people judge to be wrong: we are all justified in judging that murder, 
exploitation, assault, theft, etc., are wrong, extenuating circumstances notwithstanding. In 
addition, with regard to more difficult cases, it is certainly plausible that FJAR could be 
expanded to offer more specific advice on how to resolve conflicts, and the reply I outline 
above provides something of a start. 
Looking Forward: FJAR, REC, and Moral Reasoning 
In the following, I will briefly discuss how FJAR relates to Radzik's REC and how it 
could function in relation to moral reasoning.  
Recall that one condition that Radzik places on REC is that it be comprehensive. A 
comprehensive theory is supposed to give us "a point of view from which we can look 
over all the interest-defined evaluative schemes and judge which ones should be allowed 
influence over our choices" (32). As Radzik's REC stands, it does not give us much 
advice about to what degree the norms associated with normative moral judgments 
should override other norms, such as prudential norms. As REC and FJAR are both 
subjectivist theories, a definite answer that applies to each and every individual is likely 
not forthcoming. Instead, we could develop REC so that it offers individuals advice about 
when they should take moral norms to be overriding and when they should not. For 
instance, because people often engage in various forms of self-deception to justify their 
acting in ways that, if they were not motivated otherwise, they would judge to be 
immoral, we could recommend methods and patters of thinking that help people avoid 
this variety of self-deception.22 The idea behind this would not be to develop a definitive 
formula that an individual could use to determine whether demands of morality are 
                                                                          
22 For more on this variety of self deception, see Lorraine Besser-Jones’ “Social Psychology, Moral Character, and 
Moral Fallibility.” 
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overriding in any given situation. Rather, we would be suggesting ways whereby a person 
could himself decide which norms he really thinks are overriding, or which norms he 
would decide really were overriding in the absence of distorting factors, such as self-
deception. In fact, I have already given some advice on this matter by distinguishing 
between morally relevant and irrelevant affective responses. Clearly, though, more work 
on this issue needs to be done. 
Moving on, when people engage in moral reasoning, they tend to do so by working 
from general principles to particular judgments, through analogies, by deliberation, etc. 
For example, it seems perfectly reasonable for a person to work from the general 
principle that causing other people pain is wrong to the particular judgment that beating 
up one's younger brother is wrong (deduction), or from the judgment that picking on 
people at school is wrong, so picking on people at cub scouts is wrong. In each of these 
cases, the concluding judgment seems to be valid; the moral judgment that we reach in 
either case seems justified, even though FJAR has not been applied.  
To account for this, I suggest that for an instance of moral reasoning to be valid, it 
needs to preserve justification, or simply produce a justifiable conclusion, where 
justification is understood through FJAR. This means that any concluding judgment 
reached through moral reasoning has to pass the same test that affective responses have to 
pass. In other words, the concluding judgment cannot be in conflict with any other 
motivationally relevant affective responses. In the above analogical case, justification is 
preserved because the situations involved are sufficiently similar - in moving from the 
one scenario to the other, no new relevant affective responses would be triggered, and 
thus the concluding judgment is justified. In the deductive case, the situation is a little 
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different. For, it involves the general principle that causing other people pain is wrong. 
Nonetheless, a general principle like this only confers justification, and is itself justified, 
one would think, if specific instances of causing people pain prove to be wrong. So, 
general principles only confer justification insofar as the specific situations that they 
describe tend to prove to be either wrong or right, whichever the case may require. In the 
case of the principle that causing people pain is wrong, it will probably turn out that in 
the majority of instances where one person causes another pain, we are indeed justified in 
judging that action to be wrong. Therefore, the principle 'causing other people pain is 
wrong' is likely a fairly reliable justification conferring principle.23  
To make clear what I mean here, I will consider an instance where the conclusions 
that we reach through moral reasoning do not turn out to have full-blown justification on 
an application of FJAR. First, consider the principle 'stealing is wrong.' Now, consider 
the specific judgment that we can draw from this principle: 'stealing from the grocery 
store in order to feed one's family is wrong.' Here the concluding judgment is at the very 
least questionable. For, although people certainly tend to be motivated to judge that 
stealing is wrong because they have a negative affective response to stealing (e.g., anger), 
simply working from the general principle does not establish itself that this specific 
implementation of it is valid. For, although people tend to be motivated to judge that 
stealing is wrong, people also tend to be motivated to judge that feeding one's family is 
right, and many people presumably are motivated to judge that stealing to feed one's 
family is right. To be clear, I am not saying that the judgment 'stealing to feed one's 
family is right' is necessarily justified, but only to show that just working from a general 
                                                                          
23 In fact, there might be general principles that are always justification conferring: for instance, the more specific 
judgments/conclusions that people reach from the principle that 'wanton cruelty to other people is wrong' are unlikely 
to be overturned by an application of FJAR. 
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moral principle does not ensure that the conclusion is justified.  
 With regard to both REC and moral reasoning, questions obviously remain, and they 
certainly are worthy of investigation. However, the goal of this paper was only to show, 
in outline, how a coherentist theory of justification could be applied to affective 
responses and, subsequently, the normative moral judgments we base on them. Given this 
modest goal, I think I have shown that a more developed project of this nature could 
prove profitable.  
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Conclusion 
Throughout this paper, my explicit goal was to show how a person could go about 
justifying his affective responses as reasons for making normative moral judgments. In 
reaching this goal, the most important conclusions that I argued for were that normativity 
is prima facie inherent in affective response, that affective response does indeed play an 
important explanatory and causal role with regard to an emotion-heavy sentimentalist 
theory of moral judgment, and that it is at least possible for a person to go about 
justifying his moral judgments by considering his affective responses.   
The underlying motivation for this paper, though, is more general. I began with a 
quote from Peter Railton, and it is worth reading again:  
Ethical Naturalism has yet to find a plausible synthesis of the empirical 
and the normative: the more it has given itself over to descriptive accounts 
of the origin of norms, the less has it retained recognizably normative 
force; the more it has undertaken to provide a recognizable basis for moral 
criticism of reconstruction, the less has it retained a firm connection with 
descriptive social or psychological theory.  
Each of the more important conclusions that I argued for in this paper were intended to 
help resolve this conflict. However, one conclusion in particular could go far in bringing 
together descriptive and normative moral discourse. 
With regard to the prima facie normativity inherent of affective response, in a 
naturalist theory, as Stephen Darwall notes, the only thing that normative force can be is 
motivational force (Internalism 168). Because affective response is so closely tied to 
motivation, we can plausibly claim, within a naturalistic scheme, that affective response 
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is intimately connected with normativity. This seems to be an especially potent 
combination for sentimentalists with a naturalistic bent, as it provides them with a 
potentially very profitable starting point from which to engage in normative moralizing. 
Indeed, taking this tack helps resolve some of the more salient problems associated with 
developing a normative theory, namely, first-person accessibility and regress. 
Nonetheless, this approach to normativity does give up on many of the things that 
several theorists believe are necessary for a normative theory to be valid, namely, moral 
objectivity (‘external’ justification of affective responses), and an unshakeable foundation 
from which we can claim that the norms of morality decisively override other norms, 
such as norms of prudence. However, if sentimentalists are prepared to give up these 
aspects of traditional normative theory, they have at their disposal a very naturalistic 
basis from which to develop a normative moral theory.     
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